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I.

INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS MISSING FROM THIS
PICTURE?

On March 27, 2014, Iwao Hakamada was released from the
Tokyo Detention Center’s death row. 1 In 1966, the former
professional boxer had been arrested and prosecuted for the murder
of a wealthy executive and his family, as well as the arson and
robbery of their home.2 Hakamada was convicted in 1968 and his

* Professor, Doshisha University Law School. The author would like to take the
opportunity to acknowledge the guidance and encouragement of Professor Setsuo Miyazawa
over the years, without which this article would probably never have been written.
1 Justin McCurry, Japanese Man Freed After 45 Years on Death Row as Court Orders
Retrial, GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/27/
japanese-man-freed-death-row-retrial [https://perma.cc/3RP4-RM9Y].
2 Id.
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conviction affirmed by Japan’s Supreme Court in 1980.3 He went on
to become “the world’s longest-serving death row inmate.”4 There
was just one problem: he was almost certainly innocent.
Hakamada’s conviction was based primarily on his own
confession as well as a pair of bloodstained pants the police insisted
were his despite not fitting.5 His confessions were coerced, based on
“23 straight days of daily 12-hour interrogations, punctuated by
threats and beatings” during which he stated he “could do nothing but
crouch down on the floor trying to keep from defecating.”6
In court, he recanted and of the forty-five written confessions
presented as evidence by the prosecution, the bench rejected fortyfour of them as not having been given freely. Fortuitously (or perhaps,
“inexplicably”), the single remaining confession was found not to
have been coerced and formed the principal evidence underlying his
conviction, even though one of the judges who convicted him secretly
thought he was innocent and ultimately quit the bench over his failure
to convince his two colleagues on the three-judge panel.7
Almost immediately after his conviction was confirmed by
the Supreme Court, his lawyers moved for a new trial.8 This was
rejected thirteen years later. 9 An unsuccessful round of appeals
followed, and the entire process was restarted anew by the filing of a
second motion for a new trial in 2008. By 2010, an alliance of Diet
members was formed to advocate on his behalf. Hakamada had been
a cause celebre, symbolizing everything that was wrong with the
Japanese criminal justice system. 10 According to the U.N.
Committee on torture, his time on death row would have constituted
a form of mental torture.11
3

Id.
Id.
5 Charles Lane, On Death Row in Japan, HOOVER INST. POL’Y REV. (Aug. 1, 2005),
http://www.hoover.org/research/death-row-japan [https://perma.cc/86A6-NU52].
6 Id.
7 Ex-judge Denied Visit to Inmate, JAPAN TIMES (July 3, 2007), http://www.japantimes.
co.jp/news/2007/07/03/national/ex-judge-denied-visit-to-inmate/#.V0_OpWB-PIV [https://
perma.cc/T3EM-3YVK].
8 Lane, supra note 5.
9 Id.
10 Chisaki Watanabe, On Death Row and a Cause Celebre, JAPAN TIMES (May 9, 2008),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/05/09/national/on-death-row-and-a-cause-celebre/
#.WQjYOvmzLJA [https://perma.cc/BXY9-Z7XQv].
11 U.N. Comm. Against Torture (CAT), Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Committee Against Torture: Japan, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/JPN/CO/1 (Aug. 3, 2007),
4
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Hakamada’s is not an isolated incident. Enzai or wrongful
convictions—some for high profile murder cases, others for lesser
crimes like groping women on trains—are a staple feature in the
Japanese media. 12 The titles of high profile wrongful conviction
cases are probably more familiar to most Japanese law students than
the names of the Supreme Court judges.
There are a number of reasons why enzai cases occur, but a
key piece of the puzzle is the ability of police and prosecutors to
detain suspects for prolonged periods with limited access to counsel
before a charging decision is made. Other factors, such as limited
access to exculpatory evidence by the defense, make trials very proprosecution (to say the least), resulting in a justice system that often
seems to operate at odds with seemingly clear constitutional
mandates regarding criminal procedure—mandates that on their face
would seem very familiar to Americans.13
One thing that does not feature in accounts of enzai, however,
is habeas corpus. Japan has had a habeas corpus statute since 1948,14
one that is conspicuously absent from discourse about enzai, not only
in the context of the all-too-common accounts of prolonged coercive
detentions by police, but also subsequent efforts to obtain prompt
judicial relief when it becomes readily apparent that an innocent
person has been convicted. As already noted, it took the Shizuoka
District Court thirteen years to rule on Hakamada’s motion for a new
trial.15 Similarly, Toshikazu Sugaya, who served seventeen years in
prison for the murder of a young child based on a coerced confession
and DNA evidence, was not freed through habeas corpus
immediately after more advanced DNA testing confirmed his
http://www.refworld.org/publisher,CAT,,JPN,46cee6ac2,0.html
[https://perma.cc/3TS9TK93] [hereinafter UNCAT Japan Report].
12 See, e.g., Kazuko Ito, Wrongful Convictions and Recent Criminal Justice Reform in
Japan, U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 1245 (2012) (discussing recent criminal justice reform in
Japan and media’s role). See also SOREDEMO BOKU WA YATTENAI [I JUST DIDN’T DO IT] (Fuji
TV 2006) (Japan). The Director Masayuki Suo’s stark depiction of the prolonged detention
and ultimate conviction of a young man erroneously accused of groping a woman on a train
was based on an actual case. See Kenji Hirano, Film on Accused Gropers Reflects Judiciary
Flaws: Lawyers, JAPAN TIMES (July 11, 2007), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/
2007/07/11/national/film-on-accused-gropers-reflects-judiciary-flaws-lawyers/#.V1qIGG
B-PIU [https://perma.cc/R5W7-K268] (discussing how the film I Just Didn’t Do It reflects
actual issues with the Japanese judiciary).
13 Ito, supra note 12.
14 Jin shin hogohō [Habeas Corpus Act], Law No. 199 of 1948 (Japan) [hereinafter
Habeas Corpus Act].
15 Lane, supra note 5.
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innocence. He was freed pending a new trial after the prosecutors
essentially acknowledged his likely innocence—a subtle, but
important difference.16 In that case, it also took the court over five
years to reject his motion for a new trial.17

II. HABEAS CORPUS AS A BELLWEATHER OF
COMPARATIVE LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL DECLINE
Habeas corpus provides an excellent example of the pitfalls
of comparative law. After all, it would be factually correct to say that
Japan has a habeas corpus statute, the Habeas Corpus Act, which will
be discussed in greater detail in the pages that follow. It would also
be correct to describe this statute as providing for prompt judicial
relief from unlawful detentions in contravention of constitutional
principles. However, both of these technically correct statements
would be widely misleading as to how habeas corpus is actually used
in Japan and how one would go about obtaining judicial relief for
improper detentions in the country. As this article will show, habeas
corpus does play a role in the Japanese legal system, albeit an obscure,
largely unheroic one that is almost completely divorced from its
original intent and the text used to formulate the remedy it purports
to offer.
A case can also be made that the fate of habeas corpus is
indicative of the direction taken by Japan’s constitution as a whole.
In the Anglo-American system, habeas corpus is a remedy of
constitutional, indeed, proto-constitutional significance. It is the
“Great Writ” of common law jurisprudence—“the most stringent
curb the ever legislation imposed on tyranny.”18 As a form of relief
from arbitrary detention, habeas corpus predates not only the U.S.
Constitution (where it is one of the scant few “human rights”
provisions contained in the original charter prior to the addition of the
Bill of Rights), but also the 1679 Act of Parliament that codified it
into a more modern form out of the common law primordial ooze. As
this Article will show, in Japan it has become something very
different.
16

Setsuko Kamiya, High Court OKs Sugaya Retrial, JAPAN TIMES (June 24, 2009),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2009/06/24/national/high-court-oks-sugaya-retrial/#.V1
Am_GB-PIV [https://perma.cc/JA5K-Z5GG].
17 Id.
18 2 THOMAS MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND 3 (1848).
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The Japanese constitution is a long, detailed document
containing some of the Anglo-American constitutional ideals
reflecting its unusual, partially American provenance. The direction
it has taken since its promulgation in 1947, however, is an
exceptionally complex thing to track, comprised of intertwining
strands of academic theory, executive branch interpretation, and
judicial precedents. As a result, whether its original ideals have been
given life is a difficult question to answer in general terms, seven
decades later. By contrast, habeas corpus represents a single
constitutional ideal whose arc in post-war Japan can be readily
tracked as a single strand, independent of the morass of constitutional
jurisprudence.
Although the Japanese government has in recent years
devoted significant resources to translating its laws into English, the
Jinshin Hogo Hō (Habeas Corpus Act) of 1948 is not one of them.
The text of the translation promulgated in the English language
version of the kanpō, the official gazette, is attached to the end of this
article for reference.19

III.

ORIGINS

Japan’s previous constitution, the Constitution of the Empire
of Japan—commonly referred to as the Meiji Constitution—provided
that “[n]o Japanese subject shall be arrested, detained, tried or
punished, unless according to law.”20 This allowed for detentions in
accordance with the law, and there were ample laws and regulations
on which detentions could be founded. Writing in January 1946, U.S.
Army lawyer Lieutenant Colonel Milo Rowell noted that:

19 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14. Japanese laws and regulations are promulgated
in the Official Gazette, and until the end of the occupation in 1952, an English version of the
Official Gazette was also produced. At the time of writing, access to these records was
possible through the website of the Legal Information Institute of Nagoya University, at
http://jalii.law.nagoya-u.ac.jp/project/jagasette [https://perma.cc/7NZE-V9JE].
The absence of a more recent, error-free translation in the modern database may reflect a
view that law is simply not important. In reality, the Act would likely be relevant to nonJapanese people seeking legal information in English, since two common scenarios for their
involvement in the Japanese legal system may be (a) detention in immigration facilities and
(b) child custody disputes, where habeas corpus relief was long used as a mechanism for
enforcing custody orders. See discussion infra.
20 DAI NIHON TEIKOKU KENPŌ [MEIJI KENPŌ] [MEIJI CONSTITUTION], art. 23 (Japan).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017

412

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 12

All manner of abuses have been practiced by the
police and procurators in the enforcement of general
law, but primarily in the enforcement of the thought
control law. It is not unusual for people to be
incarcerated for months and years without charges
being filed, during all of which time attempts are made
to force confessions from the accused. It is strongly
recommended that Constitutional guarantees be
required which will prevent imprisonment without
charges being filed.21
As we shall see, this American view of the situation in Japan
is consistent with problems identified by Japanese participants in the
Diet debates over the Act’s adoption.
What accounts do exist of the introduction of habeas corpus
during the American occupation attribute it to a petition by a Japanese
lawyers’ group, the Zenkoku Bengoshi Hōkoku Kai, to Macarthur’s
General Headquarters (GHQ) early in the American occupation.22 In
one of the standard accounts of occupation-era legal reforms, Alfred
Oppler asserts that habeas corpus was a Japanese initiative, though
one that the Americans were likely to view amenably:
This law [the Habeas Corpus Act] implemented the
constitutional guarantee that no person shall be
deprived of life or liberty, except according to
procedure established by law. Here again, the
Government Section [i.e., of the Allied occupation
authorities] was careful not to put pressure on the
Japanese to adopt something resembling the American
writ. The Japanese themselves took the initiative, and
after thorough preparation in which the judiciary, the
21 Memorandum from General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for The Allied
Powers Government Section—Public Administration Branch on Comments on
Constitutional Revision proposed by Private Group for Chief of Staff (Jan. 11, 1945)
[hereinafter SCAP Memorandum], http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/060/060
tx.html [https://perma.cc/SD5F-REUA]. Note that although thought control laws are
definitely a thing of the past, the prolonged detentions focused on procuring confessions are
still at the core of problems with the criminal justice system identified by civil libertarians
and criminal defense lawyers seven decades later.
22 Yoshitoshi Mochinobu, Nihonkokukenpō Dai 18 Jō, 34 Jō no Seitei no Ikisatsu [The
Process of the Drafting Articles 18 and 34 of the Constitution of Japan], 48 KYUSHŪ KŌGYŌ
DAIGAKU KENKYŪ HŌKOKU 95, 107 (2000).
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executive branch, the legislature, and the bar had a
hand, while my division was available for advice, a
Habeas Corpus Act was finally introduced as a
member bill into the Diet, and was enacted on July 30,
1948. General MacArthur was particularly delighted
with this piece of legislation, since his father had
introduced a Habeas Corpus Act in the Philippines.23
Other sources confirm this view. Before it disbanded, the
National Patriotic Federation of Lawyers (Zenkoku Bengoshi Hōkoku
Kai), a lawyers’ association formed during wartime, petitioned GHQ
and the Japanese government for a habeas corpus-like system of
judicial relief for deprivations of freedom.24 That said, the Americans
were also cognizant of the need for “some proceeding which will
compel the police to bring an arrested person publicly before a court
and explain the reason for his imprisonment, similar to a writ of
habeas corpus.”25
According to the History of the Non-Military Activities of the
Occupation of Japan, the Habeas Corpus Act was enacted to give
concrete meaning to article 34 of the new constitution.26 The article
mandates that:
No person shall be arrested or detained without being
at once informed of the charges against him or without
the immediate privilege of counsel; nor shall he be
detained without adequate cause; and upon demand of
any person such cause must be immediately shown in
open court in his presence and the presence of his
counsel.27
The English version of this provision is potentially misleading
in a way that is relevant to habeas corpus. 28 First, the Japanese
23

ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN 149 (1976).
Yoshitoshi, supra note 22, at 106–07.
25 SCAP Memorandum, supra note 21 (emphasis added).
26 The author has relied on the Japanese translation of these materials, contained in 14
NAYA HIROMI, GHQ NIHON SENRYŌSHI: HŌSEI, SHIHŌSEIDO NO KAIKAKU 69 (Takemae Eiji
& Nakamura Takafusa eds., 1996).
27 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 34 (Japan) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTION] (author translation) (emphasis added).
28 It is worth appreciating that the occupation authorities and their Japanese government
interlocutors were working in parallel across languages and that the goal of the Japanese side
24

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017

414

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 12

version has a full stop following “privilege of counsel.” In essence,
it can potentially be read as articulating two separate constitutional
protections: (1) the right to know the grounds for arrest and detention
and privilege of counsel and (2) freedom from detention without
adequate cause, such cause being subject to explanation in open court
upon demand.
Second, the Japanese does not say “upon demand of any
person,” but rather just “upon demand.” Thus, while the English
version suggests that the constitution itself provides grounds for any
person to petition a court for relief for a wrongfully detained person
(people in such straits typically being unable to do so themselves),29
the Japanese does not. In fact, the original GHQ draft of this
provision limited demands to “the accused or his counsel,” which was
subsequently revised to “upon demand of any person” in the English
draft that was then submitted to the Japanese government, the socalled “MacArthur Draft.”30 In any case, a clear statement that “any
person” can petition on behalf of a wrongfully detained person was
set forth in the Habeas Corpus Act.31 As we shall see, though, the
Supreme Court subsequently used its rule-making authority and
decisions to render these words largely meaningless.
Note that some scholars have expressed the view that the
Habeas Corpus Act was adopted to give life to the Article 18
protection against involuntary servitude, which in most instances
would involve detention by non-state actors.32 This appears to reflect
a widespread initial confusion about the purpose of habeas corpus
within the Japanese justice system as a whole and its relationship to
Japan’s Code of Criminal Procedure, which itself underwent
was not necessarily to prepare a scrupulously accurate translation of the English text being
proffered by the Americans.
29 The Japanese language does not require sentences to have a subject. A more accurate
translation of the highlighted language would probably be “upon demand, such cause . . .”
leaving open the possibility of being interpreted to allow demands from any person.
30 See Yoshitoshi, supra note 22, at 107–10 (discussing the various iterations of what
became article 34). Yoshitoshi also quotes other Japanese scholars expressing the view that
the “any person” language in the English version is best read as referring to the detained and
his counsel, rather than anyone in the world at large. Id. at 115. The various drafts of the
constitution prior to the final can be accessed at the National Diet Library’s “Birth of the
Constitution of Japan” website. Part 1 Military Defeat and Efforts to Reform the
Constitution, NATI’L DIET LIBR., http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01shiryo.html
[https://perma.cc/HSX9-W633].
31 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 2(2).
32 Yoshitoshi, supra note 22, at 97–105.
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extensive restructuring under the American occupation to make it
consistent with the constitution and provide for procedural
protections, such as the privilege of counsel and the right of the
accused to know the nature of the charges against him.33 Certainly,
the possibility of habeas corpus being used to remedy deprivations of
freedom by non-state actors—employers, mental hospitals and even
parents feuding over children—was anticipated as one possible use
for habeas corpus, though as we shall see most of the debate focused
on its more obvious constitutional dimensions in cases of wrongful
detentions by state actors.34

IV.

“LIKE LOOKING FOR FISH IN A TREE”—THE DIET
DEBATES HABEAS CORPUS

The bill that became the Habeas Corpus Act was first
presented for consideration to the Judicial Committee of the House
of Councillors on February 20, 1948, with the corresponding
committee of the House of Representatives commencing hearings on
the same bill the following month. Over the next three months, a
series of deliberations were held in both committees, which heard
testimony from legal scholars, lawyers and other commentators.
After some amendments by the House of Councilors, the bill was
ultimately passed by both chambers and promulgated on July 30,
1948.
Although this Article can only touch on them briefly, the
debates over the Habeas Corpus Act offer some fascinating insights
into how at least a segment of the Japanese intelligentsia viewed the
recent history of their nation’s legal system. A portion of the
legislative history is unsurprisingly devoted to the principles behind
this strange new law, as well as its history in the Anglo-American
system.
Some of those who participated were skeptical. For example,
on March 23, 1947, a speaker by the name of Ichirō Kobayashi
offered the following explanation of the need for the Act, not only
based on the limits of the previous constitutional system, but the
33

OPPLER, supra note 23, at 136–49.
When first introduced to the Diet, the law was described as applying to all
deprivations of liberty, whether in connection with criminal cases or not, and whether by
state actors or private actors. SANGIIN SHIHŌ IINKAI KAIGIROKU DAI 4 GŌ [HOUSE OF
COUNCILORS JUDICIAL COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES NO. 4], at 1 (Feb. 20, 1948) (Japan).
34
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possible limits of the new one as well. Those familiar with the state
of the Japanese criminal justice seven decades later may find them
oddly familiar.
As everyone knows, the freedom and personal
liberties of the people enjoyed fine protection under
the Meiji Constitution too. Constitutionally, Japanese
subjects could not be arrested, detained, questioned or
punished except in accordance with the law.
Moreover, the laws guaranteed the freedoms of the
people, the subjects, with all manner of provisions. So
why are there so many accounts of human rights
abuses? For example, there is voluntary going to the
police station or accompanying an office there, which
becomes “stay the night” then “stay tomorrow night,”
resulting in a loss of freedom through the police.35 Or
using the Administrative Enforcement Act. Or the
Police Punishment Regulation.36 Or even though the
suspect has an address, using “lack of address” as
grounds for detention. 37 Or putting people in
“protective” custody without reason.38 These are the
35

Nin’i dōkō or “voluntary accompaniment” remains a common practice in Japan, one
that can lead to coercive deprivations of freedom that lead in confessions before an arrest
warrant is even detained. An example of how endemic the practice has become is illustrated
by a June 25, 2012 news story about a man who “voluntarily” accompanied a constable to a
police box after being accused of touching a woman’s thigh on a train. He then got up to
use the bathroom but was able to “escape” through the unlocked back door of the police box.
Chikan Yōgi no Otoko, Nin’i Dōkō no Kōban Uraguchi kara Tōsō [Man Charged with
Molesting Voluntarily Turned Himself in, Then Escaped from Police Station Through Rear
Entrance], YOMIURI SHIMBUN (June 25, 2012), http://policestory.cocolog-nifty.com/
blog/2012/06/post-720a.html [https://perma.cc/VU5R-TQ9T]. This incident was reported
as a comical example of police incompetence that allowed a “criminal” to escape, but of
course “voluntary accompaniment” meant that the man should have been free to leave at any
time anyways.
36 The Police Punishment Regulations dated back to the pre-war era and empowered
the police to both define a wide range of behaviors as minor crimes and try and mete out
punishments for violations, providing a pretext to arrest people in a wide range of
circumstances. The regulations were abolished under the occupation, but replaced by the
Minor Offenses Act, which was considered at the same time as the Habeas Corpus Act, and
informed some of the debate.
37 Lack of an address remains grounds for a court to detain a suspect or deny bail. KEIJI
SOSHŌ HŌ [KEISOHŌ] [C. CRIM. PRO.] 1948, art. 58, 60, 89.
38 Under the Police Duties Execution Act, police officers are still able to use protective
custody as grounds for detaining persons outside the scope of the arrest/detention regime
provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure and the Constitution, such custody being
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common tools of police and investigating authorities
and everyone knows it. Just calling them human
rights abuses doesn’t accomplish anything. Why is
that? Because even though the constitution guaranteed
the freedoms of the people—the subject—there was a
lack of means of enforcing that guarantee.39
On the merits of the Act, Kobayashi notes that
From now on, Ministers of State or anyone else who
dares to hide behind the Emperor’s sleeves in their
illegal conduct will not be able to. They won’t be able
to say “I am detaining this person on the order of the
Emperor, because it won’t be an excuse under the
Habeas Corpus Act. So you see, as should be
abundantly clear from this point, an order under the
Habeas Corpus Act will be binding on all high
officials, all bureaucrats regardless of their rank. They
must all obey it. Moreover, such an order may
sometimes be made in opposition to someone who is
extremely powerful at the time.40
A recurring theme in the Diet debates was whether Habeas
Corpus proceedings were criminal or civil in nature. The entire
Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure was being amended at the same
time for reasons similar to those underlying the adoption of Habeas
Corpus, in order to eliminate the type of abuses that had occurred in
the past and making the criminal process consistent with the new
constitution. Thus, a sense of confusion seems to prevail amongst
many of the speakers about how habeas corpus will fit into the overall
context of arrest and detention provided for in the new Code, a system
justified because, “on the basis of unusual behavior and other surrounding circumstances,
and moreover [the police officer] has reasonable grounds to believe that such person needs
emergency aid and protection.” Keisatsukan Shokumu Shikkō-hō [Police Duties Execution
Act], Law No. 136 of 1948, art. 3 (Japan). To the author’s knowledge, protective custody
does not feature significantly in stories of abusive police practices leading to enzai cases,
though those who experience it are likely to end up in the same police jail as someone who
is arrested.
39 SANGIIN SHIHŌ IINKAI KAIGIROKU DAI 5 GŌ [HOUSE OF COUNCILORS JUDICIAL
COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES NO. 5], at 9 (Mar. 23, 1948). Unless otherwise noted, all
translations are by the author.
40 Id. at 10.
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that constitutionally requires a warrant except in cases of crimes in
process.41 One of the greatest obstacles to habeas corpus achieving
any meaningful presence in the Japanese legal system may be
attributable to the fact that the judiciary as a whole was (and is)
complicit in many of the pre-trial deprivations of freedom that did
(and do) take place through the issuance of detention warrants.42 This
was acknowledged by some of the participants in the Diet debates.43
Could it be expected that the same court that issued a
detention warrant would seriously entertain a writ of habeas corpus
by or on behalf of the detainee? Various commentators advocated
having habeas corpus petitions be made directly to High Courts,
perhaps even the Supreme Court. This latter suggestion was rejected
due to the expense and inconvenience that would be involved in
seeking a writ on behalf of someone detained in an isolated part of
the country, such as Hokkaido.44
The uncertainty about whether it was a civil remedy or part of
the criminal process also provided grounds for complaints about the
41

CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, art. 33.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to get into the details of Japanese criminal
procedure. However, it should be noted that Japan does not have a system of arraignment
following arrest. What it has instead is a set of deadlines by which police or prosecutors
must either release a suspect, bring charges, or apply to a judge for a warrant to detain the
suspect for up to ten days. The warrant can be detained for an additional ten days. As a
result, a suspect can be held for up to twenty-three days with limited access to counsel before
a charging decision is made. Under this system, the suspect will be taken before a judge
shortly before arrest, but the reason is not to confirm the charges against him, but to examine
the prosecutor’s reasons for seeking detention. Under article 60 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the common reasons for seeking detention are “flight risk” and “risk of evidence
tampering,” both of which are based on a presumption of guilt. KEIJI SOSHŌ HŌ [C. CRIM.
PRO.] Law No. 131 of 1948, art. 60. Once the detention warrant is issued, the police and
prosecutors have ample time to investigate the suspect under highly coercive conditions.
Note that for detention purposes, even an acquittal by a trial court is not adequate to rebut
the presumption of guilt, since appellate courts can and do order continued detention pending
prosecutorial appeals! There is a procedure for seeking an explanation of the reasons for
detention (C. CRIM. PRO., art. 82) but it is rarely used, possibly because there may be little
merit for many petitioners to simply have the reason for a detention already authorized by
the court explained in open court. That the procedure is intended to be a formality is
suggested by practice rules that allow petitioners only ten minutes to voice opinions to the
court. KEIJI SOSHŌ KISOKU [CRIM. TRIAL RULES], Sup. Ct. Rule No. 32 of 1948, art. 85-3(1).
43 See, e.g., HOUSE OF COUNCILORS JUDICIAL COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES NO. 5,
supra note 39, at 7, 8, 11 (describing some participants acknowledging the complicity of the
judiciary in pre-trial deprivation of freedom).
44 SANGIIN SHIHŌ IINKAI KAIGIROKU DAI 16 GŌ [HOUSE OF COUNCILORS JUDICIAL
COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES NO. 16], at 10 (Apr. 26, 1947) (Japan). As a compromise,
the Habeas Corpus Act allows for petitions to be filed at either the District or High Court.
42
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law on the part who saw the “civil procedure”-like structuring of the
process, with petitioner and detainer being treated equally; the
petitioner being burdened with proving that the detention was
“without legal procedure”45 and detainers having a right of appeal.
Would any detention that satisfied the requirements of the code of
criminal procedure (i.e., with legal procedure) survive a petition, even
if there were no “adequate grounds” as required by article 34 of the
Constitution?46
In the context of other procedural protections, both those built
into the criminal procedural regime and the ability to sue the state (or
a private actor) in tort for wrongful deprivations of liberty, it was
recognized that money alone was often not an adequate remedy and
habeas corpus provided a potentially important source of relief for the
actual deprivation of liberty. 47 Nonetheless, there was a certain
amount of puzzlement as to how many cases involving detention by
police or prosecutors pursuant to the Code of Criminal Procedure
would result in actual relief. Participants in the debate were, of course,
cognizant that habeas corpus would also offer a remedy for
deprivations of liberty by non-state actors—workers being held in
slave-like conditions, children, people being held in mental hospitals,
and so forth. Yet the great majority of comment on the law was
clearly focused on detentions by state actors, with numerous
references to abuses that took place in the past.
Others expressed concern about the discretion to be granted
to the Supreme Court to use its new constitutional rule-making
authority to fill in the gaps in implementing the Act. In this context,
the distrust of the judiciary and the procurators expressed by some of
the commentators is illustrative. For example, in the following month,
Waseda University Professor Muneo Nakamura noted to the same
committee that while America had a unitary legal profession and a
judiciary that was supported by the people:
Japan’s courts are divided between the outsider and
insider legal professions, and judges in the courts do
not have the backing of the people. They are a
bureaucratic institution. This bureaucratic institution
needs to be broken down. What is necessary—taking
45
46
47

Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 2.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, art. 34.
SANGIIN SHIHŌ IINKAI KAIGIROKU DAI 16 GŌ, supra note 44, at 9.
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for example the Habeas Corpus Act—even if you
establish the Habeas Corpus Act, I must confess that I
have suspicions about whether it will immediately
start to function in a way that protects the people. That
is to say, I believe that a system such as this is
necessary, but the Habeas Corpus Act must be
established on the assumption that the courts cannot
be trusted.48
Later on, he complains,
I do not think the drafters of this bill have common
sense. Perhaps it is unconscious, but it seems like it
was drafted with the usual professional legal
bureaucrat’s idea of limiting the avenues for relief as
much as possible. This is the tradition for the
bureaucratic legal professions, to take the unusual
situation, the so-called exceptional case, the unfair
situation and use that as an excuse to limit everything.
For example, if there is a lawyer who acts slightly
inappropriately, they turn that into greater control over
all lawyers . . . .They take occasional problems and
turn them into generally-applicable restrictions, and
these restrictions result in the courts having greater
discretionary powers. I think that adding such
provisions has been the way legislation relating to the
judiciary has been drafted in Japan until now. I think
this has also manifested itself in the Habeas Corpus
Act. But this is a revolutionary new procedure, so it
should be allowed to impose on the courts a bit. There
may be a few petitions that seem unreasonable. Even
if the door is slightly open to such things initially,
causing some burden, isn’t it necessary to think of the
appropriate method for dealing with such people? But
it seems like this bill has been drafted so that it will be
rendered impotent.49

48 SHŪGIIN SHIHŌ IINKAI KAIGIROKU DAI 16 GŌ [HOUSE OF COUNCILORS JUDICIAL
COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES NO. 16], at 11–12 (April 26, 1948) (Japan).
49 Id.
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Perhaps the most scathing criticism of the judiciary and the
ability to expect anything of it from habeas corpus came the following
month from Hiroshi Masaki, a lawyer, who complained of the wide
discretion being given to judges in evaluating evidence:
[T]oday, judges who during wartime were the tools of
Tōjo and blithely followed the National Mobilization
Act and proudly and triumphantly crushed the antiwar sentiment of the people, wiping out all anti-war
activities of the people; these same people who are
still around . . . expecting such a judiciary to
administer human rights under the new constitution is
like looking for fish in a tree . . . .
Even though under the old constitution the concept of
judicial discretion rejected all outside freedoms,
judges have been given the freedom to consider
evidence even if it involves ignoring logic. If such
freedom is again given to judges it will mean the loss
of the people’s freedom, so in response to their
freedom to evaluate evidence, we need a provision
that says that they must follow logic and respect
reason. Otherwise there will be a huge gap through
which the rats can escape, and something fine like [the
habeas corpus law} will end up being an empty
treasure . . . .[I]f we stop allowing judges to convict
based solely on confessions, we would have to assume
that that judges have the ability to be strictly scientific
and rational. If judges lack the ability to judge
scientifically and their logic is fuzzy, it will be like
giving calculus problems to elementary school
students . . . .When judges encounter even slightly
difficult situations they just say “the evidence is
inadequate” or “there is no evidence.” Even if it is
thousands of pages, a court can look at the entire trial
record and say there is no evidence. But it’s not that
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there is no evidence, it’s that they lack the ability to
make judgments.50
Concerns about whether the judiciary could actually make
habeas corpus work the way it was intended were also expressed
through a suggestion that appeals from rejected petitions should be
heard by a panel that includes lawyers, not just professional judges,
an interesting idea that of course went nowhere.51 A concern that did
prove prescient was that habeas corpus would end up focused on
formalities rather than substance, meaning that if a detention ordered
was validly issued even though the grounds for doing so were
unwarranted (e.g., the police asserting a suspect to be a flight risk
when he really isn’t), the remedy would not be available.52
On the other side, a recurring theme was concern that the
remedy would be abused,53 a concern that is clearly reflected in the
structure of the Act (including the authority given to courts in articles
7 and 11 to dismiss a petition if it lacks substantiation or the court
determines it to be groundless based on the petition alone54) and, as
we shall see, the Supreme Court’s implementing regulations. While
some of these concerns seem directed at judicial economy and
harmonizing the new habeas corpus regime with the criminal trial
process, a different concern about possible abuses was expressed in
the context of the law’s apparent empowering of any person to
petition for relief on behalf of another detained person. For example,
would this mean that a prostitute who had freely entered indentured
servitude could be released from her debt by a husband or parent
petitioning for habeas corpus relief against her own desires? This
concern was expressed by more than one commentator, and another
finally pointed out that such business arrangements would now likely
be void.55
Ultimately the Act was promulgated on July 30, 1947. Like
the Japanese Constitution, the Habeas Corpus Act has never been
50

Id. at 16.
Id. at 12–13.
52 SHŪGIIN SHIHŌ IINKAI KAIGIROKU DAI 30 GŌ [HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIAL
COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES NO. 30], at 6 (Jun. 12, 1948) (Japan).
53 SHŪGIIN SHIHŌ IINKAI KAIGIROKU DAI 46 GŌ [2D HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JUDICIAL COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES NO. 46], at 8 (Jun. 30, 1948) (Japan).
54 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 19, art. 7, 11.
55 SHŪGIIN SHIHŌ IINKAI KAIGIROKU DAI 31 GŌ [2D HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JUDICIAL COMMITTEE MEETING MINUTES NO. 31], at 1, 3 (Jun. 14, 1948) (Japan).
51
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amended in its seven decades of existence. Instead, drastic
amendments were wrought to the Act by the Supreme Court through
its rule making powers and precedents, amendments that effectively
divorced the law from its original purpose as a remedy for human
rights violations.56

V.

THE SUPREME COURT TAKES CHARGE

At the same time the Act took effect, the newly-established
Supreme Court used its rule-making powers under the new
Constitution to establish detailed regulations for the handling of
habeas corpus cases.57 For convenience, these are referred to in this
article as the Rules. These, too, were promulgated in English but are
not available through the Japanese government’s Japanese Laws in
Translation database. Accordingly, relevant extracts of the English
as promulgated have been included as Appendix 2.
The Rules show not a “conservative” Supreme Court being
unduly conservative solicitous of the Diet, as has become the widely
accepted characterization of the court today.58 Rather, they show an
institution using its rule-making authority to ostensibly fill in the
details of a statute designed to implement “the principles of the
Japanese Constitution which guarantees the fundamental human
rights” while substantively rewriting it in a manner that makes it less
effective for doing so.59 While the Diet debates showed concern that
the text of the Habeas Corpus Act alone contained the seeds of an
implementation regime that courts could use to render it meaningless,
the Rules effectively ensured richly fertilized in which they could
grow.
56 In recent years, a common conservative talking point on the need for constitutional
amendment has involved simplistic comparisons to the number of times other “peer nations”
(the United States, France, Germany, etc.) have amended their constitutions since the
Japanese Constitution was promulgated, the logic apparently being that it is somehow
“abnormal” that Japan’s charter has remained unchanged over this same period. The
possibility that the constitution—like the Habeas Corpus Act does not actually mean as much
as positive law as its text suggests is rarely contemplated.
57 Jinshinhogo Kisoku [Habeas Corpus Rules], Sup. Ct. Rule No. 22 of 1948
[hereinafter Rules]. Article 76 of the Constitution newly created the Supreme Court at the
top of a judiciary vested with “the whole judicial power.” CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, art.
76. Article 77 vests in the Supreme Court “rule-making power under which it determines
the rules of procedure and of practice.” CONSTITUTION, supra note 27, art. 77.
58 See, e.g., David Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in
Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1545 (2009).
59 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 1; Rules, supra note 57, art. 1.
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What proved to be two of the most substantive changes were
wrought through article 4 of the Rules. First, article 4 effectively
excised the “rapid” and “easy” relief promised by article 1 of the
Habeas Corpus Act. 60 This was accomplished by empowering courts
to reject petitioners if there are “any other adequate means whereby
relief may be obtained” unless “it is evident that relief cannot be
obtained within reasonable time.” Needless to say, “adequate” does
not necessarily require “ease,” and a “reasonable time” suggests
something far less urgent than “rapid;” distinctions that have been
borne out by practice.
More significantly still, article 4 of the Rules addressed the
fear of habeas corpus abuse by allowing courts to reject petitions
where the unlawfulness of their deprivation was not “conspicuous.”61
In other words, a deprivation of freedom that was merely of suspect
legality, or only “slightly” unlawful would not be amenable to relief.
This subtle change proved to be of huge importance because it meant
courts could and did prevent the use of habeas corpus to challenge the
substantive legality (or constitutionality) of various forms of
detention. As we shall see, the “conspicuously unlawful” threshold
soon became a significant barrier to most petitioners seeking relief
from wrongful detention, even when it technically was wrongful. No
“fruit-of-the-poison-tree”-like doctrine would develop in habeas
corpus as a means of chastening police or other detaining authorities
for sloppiness. In fact, as this Article will attempt to show, the
application of the “conspicuously unlawful” threshold would result
in the procedures mandated by the Habeas Corpus Act, and thus the
Act itself, becoming for the most part substantively meaningless.
The Rules were also used to “solve” the problem created by
the inclusion in article 2(2) of the Habeas Corpus Act allowing “any
person” to file a petition on behalf of the detainee. 62 This was
accomplished by the adoption of the rather fanciful assumption that
persons deprived of their physical freedom are still able to exercise
and express free will: article 5 of the Rules outright prohibits
applications “made against the freely expressed intention of the
prisoner.”63 A similar assumption about the free will of the unlawful
underlies the addition in article 35 of the Rules of an option for
60
61
62
63

Rules, supra note 57, art. 4; Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 1.
Rules, supra note 57, art. 4.
Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 2(2).
Rules, supra note 57, art. 5.
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petitioners to withdraw their petitions prior to the court rendering
judgment (even over the objection of the detaining party).64
A more subtle change was the expansion of actions a court
could take with respect to qualifying petitions. Articles 10 and 16(3)
of the Habeas Corpus Act gave a court hearing a petition to order the
release of a prisoner either provisionally or, if the petition had
grounds, permanently. 65 That was, after all, the basic concept
underlying the whole statute. However, article 2 expanded the range
of relief a court could order “other dispositions which the court
considers suitable on behalf of the prisoner.”66 In other words, courts
could find a detention conspicuously unlawful but still refrain from
setting them “free,” a flexibility which proved useful when using
habeas corpus to address “detentions” of infant children by parents in
domestic disputes.
The Rules also enabled the courts to transform habeas corpus
in Japan from a process focused on the actual hearing and oral
testimony, as most common law practitioners would expect, to the
document-focused proceedings which prevail in Japan. Article 8 of
the Rules requires petitioners to include more information and
substantiation than is required in the law itself, and article 9
empowers courts to reject petitions which fail to satisfy these
requirements.67 Essentially, the Rules placed the burden of proving
that their detentions were conspicuously unlawful squarely on
petitioners, essentially establishing an evidentiary presumption in
favor of deprivations of liberty.
And while the Habeas Corpus Act envisioned a civil trial-like
exchange of pleadings by detaining party and detainee, the Rules
similarly expand on what a detaining party must include in the answer,
including the oddly permissive “reasons why the detainee may not be
brought to court.”68 In the event a hearing is held, the Rules also
64 Rules, supra note 57, art. 35. At least one lawyer involved in operating committee
discussions about the rules suggested that this rule represented a change of law that would
result in petitioners withdrawing petitions under coercion. SUPREME COURT SECRETARIAT,
TŌKYŌ CHIHŌ SAIBANSHO SHUSAI JINSHINHOGOHŌ UN’YŌ KYŌGI KAIGI SOKKIROKU
[TRANSCRIPT OF MINUTES OF HABEAS CORPUS ACT OPERATING COMMITTEE MEETING], at 63
(Oct. 19, 1948) (Japan) [hereinafter OPERATING COMMITTEE MINUTES]. “The law didn’t just
forget to provide for this.” Id. at 64.
65 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 10, 16(3).
66 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 2.
67 Rules, supra note 57, art. 8, 9.
68 Rules, supra note 57, art. 27.
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have the detaining party explain the substance of his answer first,
before the petitioner explains the petition.69
Finally, article 46 of the Rules removes any doubt as to the
type of procedure habeas corpus was, by declaring that gap-filling
would be in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure. 70 This
proved useful in rejecting appeals from the court’s interpretation and
application of the habeas corpus regime.

VI.

THE STAKEHOLDERS MEET

On October 19, 1948, shortly after the dust of the law- and
rule-making processes had settled, under the auspices of the Tokyo
District Court and the Civil Division of the Supreme Court, an
extraordinary gathering of representatives of the bar, Ministry of
Justice, the police, correctional facilities, prosecutors, and about two
dozen judges (but, interestingly, not a single law professor) met to
discuss what habeas corpus would actually mean in practice. The
minutes of these meetings show the starting position of the people
who would actually give life (or pseudo-life, at least) to the words of
the Habeas Corpus Act and the Rules.
The introductory remarks of the chief judge of the Tokyo
District Court are worth quoting at length as they may be indicative
of the attitude of the mainstream judiciary about not only habeas
corpus itself, but perhaps the constitution as well:
This law was enacted based on the premise that in
order to establish democracy, personal freedom must
be guaranteed as a fundamental right. In that light, I
believe it is necessary for us to realize that in
administering this law the courts are given a very
heavy responsibility. I feel it is truly ironic that courts
have been given this heavy responsibility of protecting
personal liberty. Since before this we have performed
our duties taking due consideration for personal
freedom, apparently some people go to the extent of
criticizing the courts as the true villain in trampling on
human rights. I believe such criticism is unfair, but I
also feel it is ironic that now courts are supposed to be
69
70

Rules, supra note 57, art. 29.
Rules, supra note 57, art. 46.
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the heroes in protecting personal liberty. I used to
think that in the past free courts had done their jobs in
respecting personal freedom, but recently I feel that
this view was perhaps a bit naïve.71
He also offers fascinating insights into the perception gap
between American occupation authorities and their Japanese
counterparts regarding the significance of habeas corpus.
The newspapers reported that General MacArthur
regarded the passage of this law as an extraordinary
accomplishment of the Diet. Yet the papers at the time
merely repeated the announcement as it was made.
There was not a single article newspaper article
reporting on the passage of this law. At the time I just
happened to be at GHQ meeting with some of them,
and I was asked what sort of coverage the passage of
the Habeas Corpus Act was getting in the press, and
when I told them that the papers weren’t reporting
anything their expressions showed surprise. Seeing
this, I realized that Anglo-Saxons are deeply
interested in habeas corpus, which made me feel that
our own believe that personal freedom was already
fully protected was highly naïve. We must change our
prior attitudes in implementing the law.
Previously the political and legal system and other
factors made it so that the primary responsibility of the
courts was to keep the peace and, during the war,
keeping the peace became the only responsibility of
the courts, so that even if we did think about protecting
personal liberty there it difficult to do anything about
it.72
Other judges who had participated in the process of analyzing
the Act and preparing the Rules gave their own explanations of what
they were all about.73 Topics covered included the history of habeas
71
72
73

OPERATING COMMITTEE MINUTES, supra note 64, at 9–10.
Id.
Id. at 13–37.
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corpus in the West, the background to the passage of the Act in Japan,
the details of specific articles, and the corresponding provisions of
the Rules and some of the other criminal and civil remedies available
under Japanese law for wrongful detention (such as a prosecution for
wrongful imprisonment, a tort claim or claim under the State Redress
Act for damages) and their deficiencies.74 Some time is spent on the
technicalities of the court notionally taking custody of the body of the
unlawfully detained while the proceedings are pending (even though
this meant delegating administration of the custody to the party being
accused of wrongful detention) and the effect this had on a detention
warrant (suspending its effect until the habeas corpus proceeding was
resolved, even though in practice this meant delegating
administration of the custody to the authority being accused of
wrongful detention). 75 The explanation also demonstrated an
awareness that the remedy might be used to free children or mental
patients, though such situations were also clearly considered to be
sideshows to the main event of dealing with detentions by public
authorities.76
The floor was then turned over to other participants. There
was a general agreement on the need to spread awareness of this
remedy since, in the words of one judge, the unlawful detentions that
had been “regrettably” common under the old constitution would not
go away overnight.77 Another judge remarked that it be important
that the new law not end up as “just a decoration”—and proceeded to
suggest that perhaps the police and prosecutors, the people who “have
direct contact with the people” may not be fully attentive of changes
in law and thus not aware of when they might be inadvertently (ukkari)
be violating it or even using “protective custody” (hogo) as a pretext
to detain suspects as part of a criminal investigation.78
In response, the only prosecutors present asked whether even
lawful (tadashiki) prolonged detentions might be subject under article
4 of the Rules.79 One of the judges (a section head from the Civil
Affairs Division of the Supreme Court Secretariat) indicated that
given the speedy trial requirement of article 37 of the Constitution,
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id.
Id.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 40.
Id.
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such detentions could indeed be unlawful for purposes of meeting the
article 4 threshold.80 In response, the prosecutor explained that part
of the problem was it took so long to get the relevant court documents
from the courts.81 In response, one of the lawyers politely pointed
out that it wasn’t just a matter of paperwork, but of courts failing to
keep track of the detentions they supposedly controlled, giving an
example of a suspect who sat in jail for forty-five days because the
court forgot to summon him to the trial where he was given a
suspended sentence in absentia.82
One of the two representatives of the police then spent some
time explaining how unlawful detentions by the police no longer
happened, and why they were not to blame for it happening in the
past:
Today there are no criminal investigations based on
unlawful restraints. And I think it was not something
where the police were doing things this way, it was the
momentum of the times.83
The other police representative steered the conversation to the
subject of prostitution and how the police were making a concentrated
effort to stamp out the indentured servitude version of the practice
that had prevailed in the past, noting however that there were
instances of this resulting in debts being shaken off.84
A significant portion of the discussion of the Operating
Committee focused on nitty gritty procedural issues. The discussions
of the Rules show the judiciary to be both well-intentioned, but also
clearly viewing the habeas corpus proceedings as being focused on
documents rather than oral hearings. The lawyers present pushed
back on this, at one point asking about the possibility of oral rather
than written petitions, and asking why the laws and the Rules appear
to allow the court to make a preliminary decision based on the
pleadings once it received the answer from the respondent (i.e., the
detaining party).85 Why not summon both petitioner and respondent
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 55, 57.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017

430

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 12

to court and force them both to make their case in open court—wasn’t
that how it worked in the Anglo-Saxon system?
The lawyers also rejected concerns about abuse, noting that
since the system anticipated that petitioners would have counsel
appointed in all but exceptional cases, and the Rules were designed
to make this even more likely.86 Yet couldn’t frivolous petitions be
controlled through the system for disciplining attorneys?87
The minutes reveal a fairly typical Japanese meeting: the
judicial hosts gave an opening greeting, set forth the agenda, and the
participants proceeded to comment on each item in turn before ending
on schedule. This did not prevent the expression of some vociferous
dissent by the lawyers present. Before moving on to the next chapter
of Japan’s habeas corpus story, it is worth taking note of some of
these remarks, since they accurately foreshadow the fate that habeas
corpus would suffer under the regime the Diet and the judiciary had
established:
Those of us in government positions and out must be
through in how we deal with this. If we do not, it will
become a mess, just like the jury system. In England
the jury is used in high regard, with proper preparatory
procedures. But in Japan preparatory procedures were
bad. So we need to make sure that the intent of
[H]abeas [C]orpus [A]ct are clearly appreciated
without any misunderstanding.88
and
If from the start there is a very strict method of review
based primarily on the fear that this system will be
abused, this law will never come to life. The method
of review must be considered, but if there is a little
abuse it may not be a bad thing. If the petitioner’s
petition makes sense, then the detaining party should
be investigated in the presence of the petitioner. If you
pay attention to the parties, there shouldn’t be
problems and the law will come to life. But if the
86
87
88

Id. at 63–65.
Id. at 65.
Id.
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courts act on the basis that their primary concern is to
avoid abuse, then the door will be closed from the
outset.89
Finally, it is worth noting that in the context of discussing who
has custody over petitioner while his or her petition is pending and
the way they should be treated, the practice of using police jails to
hold pre-trial detainees—thereby leaving them under constant police
control and supervision, an environment readily open to abuse and
coercion of confessions—also comes up. 90 The daiyō kangoku
system remains a feature of the criminal justice system in Japan today
and continues to be identified as part of a pre-trial detention regime
that can be abused by the police to coerce confessions.91

VII.

HABEAS CORPUS IN ACTION: FURTHER TRIMMING

From October 1948 until the end of the U.S. occupation (April
28, 1952), the Supreme Court’s online precedent database shows ten
decisions about or at least mentioning habeas corpus. Interestingly,
all were issued during the first half of this period, between 1948 and
1950.
The decisions show a Supreme Court that seems to take any
opportunity to limit the utility of habeas corpus as a remedy. For
example, although article 21 allows appeals of lower court rulings to
be appealed to the Supreme Court (within three days!) 92 , in a
December 2, 1950 opinion, the second petty bench noted that, since
article 46 of the Rules made the Code of Civil Procedure applicable
where not incompatible with the purpose of the Habeas Corpus Act,
under article 419-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure in effect at the
time, appeals from civil judgments would only be accepted by the
Supreme Court in cases involving constitutional violations.93 This
meant that even if a lower court finding that a detention was not

89

Id.
Id. at 75–76.
91 See, e.g., SILVIA CROYDON, THE POLITICS OF POLICE DETENTION IN JAPAN:
CONSENSUS OF CONVENIENCE (2016) (discussing the use of the daiyō kangoku system for
police detention).
92 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 21.
93 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 2, 1950, Sho 25 (ku) no. 124, 3 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1159. The current Code of Civil Procedure was enacted in 1996.
90

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017

432

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 12

“conspicuously” unlawful (the threshold set by article 4 of the Rules94)
was demonstrably wrong, appeals to the Supreme Court could be
rejected on the grounds that they asserted a misinterpretation of the
law rather than a constitutional violation.
In a similar vein, a December 17, 1949 decision by the Second
Petty Bench rejected an argument from a petitioner arguing that the
Rules unfairly closed the door to most habeas corpus petitions. 95
Specifically mentioned were article 6 of the Rules requiring
petitioners to prove that special circumstances prevented them from
being represented by counsel (as generally required by article 3 of the
Habeas Corpus Act), the information and substantiation requirements
imposed on petitioners through article 7 of the Rules, and the article
8 requirement that courts reject defective petitions.96 Here, too, the
Supreme Court characterized this as being an argument that courts
should conduct their own information gathering.97 It was thus not a
constitutional claim for purposes of article 419-2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and rejected accordingly.98
On the constitutional front, a December 24, 1949 Third Petty
Bench decision found that a person whose initial arrest, detention,
and conviction at initial trial was unlawful, did not qualify as a
petitioner under article 2 of the Habeas Corpus Act, if the unlawful
arrest and detention did not have any impact on the trial at the appeal
level, which would have resulted in the conviction being confirmed.99
“Even if the proceedings that resulted in the detainee’s detention
included some unlawfulness, does not mean that, as argued, the
court’s judgment violates the constitution and is thus void.”100 So,
problematic arrests or detentions can be remedied on appeal,
rendering them constitutional, thereby forestalling use of habeas
corpus to challenge even constitutional procedural defects in a trial
process leading to a loss of freedom.

94

Rules, supra note 57, art. 4.
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 17, 1949, Sho 24 (ku) no. 58, 2 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 839.
96 Rules, supra note 57, art. 6, 7, 8; Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 19, art. 3.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 24, 1949, Sho 24 (ku) no. 71, 2 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 867.
100 Id.
95
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The most interesting constitutional challenge during this
period relates to Cabinet Order 201.101 This was the infamous order
issued in 1948 at the instigation of GHQ banning public sector
workers from striking, in spite of the guarantee contained in article
28 of the Constitution of workers’ rights to organize, collectively
bargain, and engage in joint action. 102 Workers imprisoned for
violating this Cabinet Order brought habeas corpus petitions that
were rejected on the grounds that petitioners were asserting their
innocence, rather than because it was “obvious and conspicuous that
the restrain[t] or a judgment order or other disposition relating to the
restraint has been made without jurisdiction or authority or has been
remarkably conflicted with formalities or proceedings prescribed in
laws, orders or rules,” the threshold established by Article 4 of the
Rules. In an October 29, 1948 ruling, the Second Petty Bench used
questionable logic to declare that, despite the petitioners having made
constitutional arguments in their petition to the lower court, the lower
court didn’t even mention the constitutional element. 103 In their
appeal to the Supreme Court, the petitioners were simply critical of
the grounds on which the lower court applied the standard set forth in
article 4 of the Rules, but failed to make a constitutional argument.104
The Court did note that the petitioners had asked for a ruling on the
constitutionality of Cabinet Order 201, but that argument has nothing
to do with the ruling of the lower court on the habeas corpus
petition—appeal denied.105
Granted, as is the case in which the Supreme Court seems
unduly solicitous of government conduct during the occupation
period (and possibly thereafter as well), a rhetorical question—what
else could the court really do?—may offer the most ready explanation.
The political impossibility of challenging the validity of Cabinet
Order 201 would have been obvious. Yet, as we shall see, the habeas
corpus decisions in this period set the tone for much of what comes
in habeas corpus jurisprudence (and, the author believes,
constitutional jurisprudence in general).
101

Naikaku Sōridaijin Ate Rengō Saikōshireikan Shokan ni Motozuku Rinji Sochi ni
kansuru Seirei Dai 201 Gō [Cabinet Order in Connection with Provisional Measures based
on Letter from SCAP to Prime Minister], July 22, 1948, No. 201 of 1948.
102 CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, art. 28.
103 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 29, 1948, Sho 23 (o) no. 88, 2 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 391.
104 Id.
105 Id.
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During this period, the court also issues its first judgment in a
type of case that, despite an absence of any clear constitutional
dimension of the type envisioned in article 1 of the Act, would
become the staple of habeas corpus litigation for several decades to
follow—child custody disputes. In a January 18, 1949 judgment
which, at three pages, is the longest of all of the court’s habeas corpus
decisions during this period, the Second Petty Bench denied an appeal
from a rejection of a habeas corpus petition by a father seeking the
return of his two young children, allegedly spirited away by his
estranged wife.106
Despite allegations that the mother used violent means to take
the children, the Supreme Court noted that, even were that the case,
it didn’t change the fact that it was best for the two children—both
infants—to be with their mother, at least until the parents or a court
decided what should happen to them after divorce. 107 What is
interesting about this case is that the dense procedural thicket thrown
up in other appeals involving detentions by police seems to vanish.
The lower court got into the substantive legality of “detention” of the
children by one parent as opposed to the other, and denied the petition
on those grounds, rather than using procedural rationales to avoid
substance as in the other cases reviewed.

VIII.

THE WAR CRIMES CASES

Perhaps the most significant habeas corpus decisions in terms
of its possible significance as any sort of remedy for constitutional
violations came shortly after the end of the American occupation in
the form of petitions filed by two groups of inmates in Sugamo Prison.
Both groups had been incarcerated as the result of convictions at war
crimes tribunals in Japan and elsewhere in Asia. One group consisted
of Japanese nationals and based their petitions on the grounds that
their deprivations of freedom resulted from procedures that were
inconsistent with the Japanese Constitution—a surprisingly
reasonable argument.
The other groups were comprised of former Japanese subjects
of Korean and Taiwanese heritage who lost their Japanese nationality
when the Treaty of San Francisco went into force on April 28, 1952.
106 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 18, 1949, Sho 23 (o) no. 130, 3 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 10 (Japan).
107 Id.
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Article 11 of the treaty declares that “Japan accepts the judgments of
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied
War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan, and will carry out
the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned
in Japan.” 108 The argument of this group of former Japanese
nationals imprisoned in Japan was essentially that, no longer being
Japanese nationals, there were no longer grounds for continuing to
detain them.
The latter case was decided first in July of 1952 and is referred
to as the Non-Japanese Case.109 The former was decided in April of
1954 and is referred to as the Japanese Case.110
Unlike the cases discussed previously, both cases were
decided by all fifteen of the court’s judges sitting en banc as a Grand
Bench. The cases are thus of particular significance, which is
unsurprising, perhaps given that they represented an opportunity for
the court to rule on the validity of the “victor’s justice” meted out
during the occupation era.
And yet, in both cases, the court did little more than ratify the
results of the war crimes tribunals and the Japanese government’s
commitment under the peace treaty to stand by them. In the NonJapanese Case, the court essentially accepted the Japanese
government’s interpretation—that for purposes of article 11 of the
peace treaty, the petitioners were still Japanese.111 For good measure,
one of the judges issued a concurring opinion opining that courts
should refrain from interpreting treaties differently from the
executive branch understanding.112
In the Japanese Case, the petitioners argued that article 11 of
the peace treaty and its implementing legislation violated the
constitution (and indeed, those convicted in Japan would have been
done so through procedures outside the scope of the constitution
when it was in force).113 The court basically ignored this argument,
noting that the treaty and related legislation required the enforcement
108 Treaty of Peace with Japan art. 11, Sept. 8, 1951, 136 U.N.T.S. 46, 56 (entered into
force Apr. 28, 1952).
109 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 30, 1952, Sho 27 (ma) no. 79, 6 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 699 (Japan) [hereinafter Non-Japanese Case].
110 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 26, 1954, Sho 28 (ku) no. 58, 8 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 848 (Japan) [hereinafter Japanese Case].
111 Non-Japanese Case, supra note 109.
112 Id.
113 Japanese Case, supra note 110.
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of the sentences, therefore the imprisonment of the petitioners was
not “conspicuously” unlawful and thus did not satisfy the threshold
requirement of article 4 of the Rules. This being the case, there was
no need to rule on the constitutional claim, since the rejection of the
original petition was justified.114
This rhetorical effort to make the elephant in the room
disappear was too much for the judges on the court. One, Tsuyoshi
Mano, a former lawyer who supposedly entered the profession after
having been inspired by reading about president Lincoln freeing the
slaves, wrote a scathing concurrence:
While I agree with the conclusion of the majority
opinion, by not making any judgment on the
appellant’s claim of constitutional violations in its
reasoning and just vaguely rejecting the appeal, I
believe that there is a serious mistake in its legal
reasoning.115
He then devotes several paragraphs to excoriating his
colleagues for failing to conduct basic reasoning and avoiding clarity
as to the constitutionality of the petitioners’ detention.116 It either was
constitutional or it wasn’t, and their use of article 4 of the Rules a
shield to deflect the constitutional issue was unacceptable. He
concludes by asserting his own view that the treaty and implementing
regulation were constitutional, and therefore the detention was not
problematic either.117
Another objection in the form of a concurrence was issued by
Hachiro Fujita, a career judge. His objection was similar to that of
Mano’s, that if detention under a law or treaty might be
unconstitutional, it was inappropriate to reject a habeas corpus
petition simply on the grounds that it was not conspicuously
unconstitutional, as the logic of article 4 of the Rules required.118 He
suggested an alternative approach to arriving at the required
conclusion, that essentially the obligations under the peace treaty
114

Id.
Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. Notably, he declined to explain how he arrived at his own conclusions as to
constitutionality.
118 Id.
115
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constituted part of Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration and
that they existed outside the constitution.119 To him, this constituted
preferable grounds for rejecting the appellants’ claims.
In the long run, perhaps the most significant thing about the
Japanese Case is that it became the source of key language that is
cited in subsequent cases, language that appears to have further
limited the scope of habeas corpus relief, despite appearing to merely
reiterate language from the Act and the Rules, specifically:
Only a person physically restrained otherwise than by
due process under law may petition for relief under the
Habeas Corpus Act, if it is conspicuous that the
restraint has been conducted or the judicial decision or
disposition on restraint has been made without
authority or in gross violation of the method or
procedure specified by laws and regulations.120
This language is followed by the following explanatory phrase:
Grounds for petitions have been limited in this way, to
cases in which violations of authority, method or
procedure are conspicuous, because the Habeas
Corpus Act is a special method of relief for the people
establishing the prompt and easy restoration of liberty
when wrongfully deprived, in accordance with the
spirit of the constitution and its guarantee of
fundamental human rights.121
The notion that limiting grounds for petitions seeking relief
for deprivations of liberty is somehow consistent with the constitution
that guarantees liberty is almost Orwellian. For our purposes,
however, the more noteworthy part of this language is the
reaffirmation of the concepts introduced in the Rules, that only
119

Id.
Id. Article 4 of the Rules limits the grounds for a petition to the “conspicuous”
threshold as previously discussed. Rules, supra note 57, art. 4. The language of this opinion
adds a further limitation on who may file an appeal, despite the “any person” language
contained in article 2 of the Habeas Corpus Act (and at least the English version of Article
34 of the Constitution). CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, art. 34; Habeas Corpus Act, supra
note 14, art. 2.
121 Japanese Case, supra note 110.
120
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deprivations of liberty that were conspicuously in violation of
“authority” (kengen), method (hōshiki) or procedure (tetuzuki) would
qualify for relief. In other words, any detentions under imprimatur of
law or legal process would likely ever get a petitioner as far as a
hearing before a court in a habeas corpus case.

IX.

HABEAS CORPUS BECOMES A FAMILY AFFAIR
(MOSTLY)

The Grand Bench revisited habeas corpus again in a 1958
decision (referred to below as the “1958 Decision”), in which it
reiterated a formula similar to that quoted above, and then added the
following gloss:
In other words, the person who requests relief under
the Habeas Corpus Act should face the following
requirements: the restraint has been conducted or the
judicial decision, etc. on restraint has been made
without authority or in gross violation of the method
or procedure specified by laws and regulations; and
these facts are conspicuous.”122
The 1958 Decision was an appeal from a rejection of a habeas
corpus petition in what would now be called a “child abduction”
situation. The facts summarized below (kindly supplied from the trial
court record by one of the concurring judges) suggest the type of
dramatic, gripping drama that only family law cases can offer.
Appellant was an American who cohabited with a geisha (G)
in a de facto marriage that continued from 1952 until her death in
1956. G had two children out of wedlock: one, the “detainee” subject
to the action (A), and a sibling (B). G brought both children with her
to live with Appellant, but B (the eldest son) was soon taken by the
G’s parents (his grandparents) and lived with them. A, however
continued to live with G and Appellant, and called Appellant
“father.”123
Around the time of G’s death, one of the grandparents brought
a successful action in family court to be named A’s guardian, and
122 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 28, 1958, Sho 32 (o) no. 227, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANREI JŌHŌ] 1, 1226.
123 Id. at 1237–1238.
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then brought various other actions seeking the return of the child,
including their own habeas corpus petition. Apparently tiring of
waiting for the wheels of justice to turn, in the January of 1957 they
took matters into their own hands, waited for A to finish kindergarten,
and bundled the child into a car.124
Appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus relief seeking the
return of the child. It was rejected, leading to an appeal to the
Supreme Court. The majority opinion used the discretion it created
for itself in article 42 of the Rules to dismiss appeals from lower court
decisions on habeas corpus petitions without a hearing if it was
apparent from the pleadings that the appeal had no merit. The
majority cited with approval the trial court’s finding that Appellant
had failed to provide any substantiation, and went so far as to note
that even if the grandparents’ abduction of the child may have been
imprudent, that alone did not mean their control over the child was
without authority or involved conspicuous unlawfulness.125 Here, we
see how article 4 of the Rules has the possibly unintended effect of
putting courts in the position of essentially ratifying potentially (but
not conspicuously) unlawful behavior.
For a number of reasons, the 1958 Decision can perhaps be
seen as a turning point, the juncture at which the apex of the Japanese
judiciary decided to allow the Habeas Corpus Act to sink into relative
obscurity, never achieving its potential as the constitutional remedy
that was clearly intended for it. First, the case reflects the
normalization of the use of habeas corpus principally in disputes over
children. This was of course one of the “private detention[s]”
anticipated at the legislative and implementation stage debates over
the Act but never as anything more than a side show. In the 1958
Decision, the majority opinion still felt the need to address the
underlying purpose of the Act by at least noting rhetorically (in the
pointlessly contorted phraseology that often characterizes court
opinions from this time) that: “it cannot be said that there are no
grounds for doubting whether problems such as these should be
handled as Habeas Corpus cases.” 126 The 1958 Decision helped
remove any remaining doubts.
Second, the majority opinion makes a point of confirming that
the habeas corpus system was not like a criminal or civil trial
124
125
126

Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1228.
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involving a detailed inquiry into factual or legal problems, but was
intended to offer a special type of “emergency” judicial relief.127 It
does so using its own Rule 4 provision allowing courts to reject
petitions if other remedies are available to challenge the detention.128
The 1958 Decision confirms that habeas corpus would rarely serve as
a vehicle for serious inquiry into the facts or law behind a detention
alleged to be unlawful, at least in any meaningful constitutional sense.
For the law or facts to be unclear would mean the detention was not
“conspicuously” unlawful.
Third, the decision shows a court still highly conflicted about
habeas corpus, with several judges clearly concerned about the
direction the court was taking it. While all of the court’s fifteen
judges agreed that the appeal should be rejected, five issued
supplemental opinions and one issued what was in substance a dissent.
Judge Mano makes another appearance, explaining in one
paragraph (that refers to earlier opinions) that a court should consider
a habeas corpus petition regardless of whether the unlawfulness of
the alleged detention is conspicuous.129 Judge Fujita, also still on the
court, objected to any interpretation of the conspicuousness
requirement of article 4 of the Rules that would create an additional
threshold to the relief promised by article 2 of the statute. 130 Judge
Junzō Kobayashi similarly asserted that the “conspicuous” language
in the Rules was merely intended to clarify the meaning of the statute
and shouldn’t be intended foreclosing relief except in cases where the
unlawfulness of a detention was obvious without the need for any
investigations of fact or law. 131 “Such an interpretation would
significantly narrow the situations in which the Habeas Corpus Act
applied, and would threaten to delegate the law to a largely decorative
existence.”132
Judge Ken’ichi Okuno similarly noted that if, as the majority
seemed to be suggesting, article 4 of the Rules and its
conspicuousness threshold meant habeas corpus would only apply in
cases where the grounds for it were so obvious that there was no need
to engage in fact-finding or resolve any uncertainty of law, then this
127
128
129
130
131
132

Id. at 1226–1227.
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1229–1230.
Id. at 1230–1231.
Id.
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would have the effect of restricting and changing the language of
article 2 of the Habeas Corpus Act. That would mean the Rules
exceeded the scope of the rule-making authority delegated to the
court by article 23 of the Habeas Corpus Act and thus be unlawful.133
Judge Daisuke Kawamura similarly objected to the significant
threshold, declaring that rejecting petitions without examining them
on this basis would result in many people being denied relief for
wrongful detention. A former lawyer, he goes so far as to pose the
question: “Would this not contravene the personal liberty guaranteed
by the Constitution of Japan and the spirit of Article 1 of the Act?”134
Judge Kobayashi also objected to the majority’s casual
dismissal of the brazen behavior of the grandparents, declining to
consider it as a component of a potentially “unlawful” detention
because it happened in the past.135 What sort of a precedent did that
set? Finally, he also pointed out a basic logical fallacy of both the
trial court ruling and the majority’s endorsement of it: that on the one
hand it involved a conclusion that there were “no disputes between
the parties as to the principal facts of the case” but saw the
Appellant’s petition dismissed because it “lacked any
substantiation.”136 In doing so, he was unknowingly acknowledging
what would become an identifiable pattern of result-oriented
jurisprudence that, in the views of the author, came to manifest itself
in habeas corpus cases and other proceedings in disputes over
children.137
As Judge Masuo Shimoizaka similarly pointed out that
although the judgment of the lower court treats the abduction as a
thing of the past—no longer an “unlawful” detention—and finds the
child to be in the loving care of the grandparents, the court was able
133 Id. Article 41 of the Constitution provides that the Diet is the “sole” law making
apparatus of the state. CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, art. 41. However, article 77 clearly
vests in the Supreme Court the power to pass, inter alia, rules of procedure and practice.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, art. 77. There are various theories as to which should prevail
in the event that a law passed by the Diet conflicts with a Supreme Court rule. See, e.g.,
ASHIBE NOBUYOSHI & TAKAHASHI KAZUYUKI, KENPŌ [CONSTITUTION] 352–253 (6th ed.
2015).
134 Id.
135 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 28, 1958, Sho 32 (o) no. 227, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANREI JŌHŌ] 1, 1231.
136 Id. at 1232.
137 See, generally, Colin P.A. Jones, In the Best Interests of the Court—What North
American Lawyers Need to Know About Child Custody and Visitation in Japan, 8 ASIA PAC.
L. & P. J. 167 (2007).
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to hold all proceedings necessary to arrive at this conclusion a mere
twenty days after the abduction took place. He found it hard to agree
that the situation represented an acceptable “restoration of liberty” or
that the child actually felt safe and free from detention. In his view,
the child was still suffering from a deprivation of liberty. Although
the lower court should be commended for acting quickly, it failed to
consider what was really important in this sort of case: what was best
for the child going forward. He thought the appeal should be rejected
but the case remanded for further proceedings.138

X.

HABEAS CORPUS FROM THEN UNTIL NOW

The cases discussed so far in this Article reveal what
happened to habeas corpus at an early stage in its history. From the
outset, the Supreme Court—with some dissenting voices—declined
to use the Habeas Corpus Act as the constitutional remedy it was
intended to be. Today, few identify it as a procedure that has anything
to do with human rights. This author has not seen any Japanese books
on the subject of human rights law in which habeas corpus is even
mentioned in the index.139
It has not lived up to its potential. In a retrospective piece on
the Habeas Corpus Act forty years after its enactment, Professor
Masayoshi Ohtani writes:
[It] must be pointed out that as far as is apparent from
the case reporters, there are plenty of instances that
should appear but do not. A list of these would include
(1) arrest for a different charge (bekken taihō) and

138

Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 28, 1958, Sho 32 (o) no. 227, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANREI JŌHŌ] 1, 1240.
139 The same holds true in constitutional law, with the Habeas Corpus Act receiving no
mention. By way of example, Professor Ashibe’s text on the constitutional law is one of the
most widely accepted introductory texts. See discussion at supra note 133. On the subject
of habeas corpus, its index contains no references to Japan’s Habeas Corpus Act, and on the
subject of writs of habeas corpus, it merely redirects readers to heibiasu korupasu, i.e. a
discussion of the remedy in the Anglo-American constitutional system.
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detention, 140 (2) emergency arrest, 141 (3)
investigations and forced confessions in substitute
prisons, (4) restrictions on bail, (5) prolonged
detention (6) limits on the defense (including the right
to request and appointing counsel), (7) improper
sentencing based on recognition of other crimes, and
(8) improper administrative actions.
Illegal
deprivations of freedom such as these were originally
supposed to be the principal subject of the habeas
corpus system, and in the Anglo-American system
these are the principal area in which it operates.
However in Japan it can be said that it is not
functioning at all, despite a growing need . . . . In
conclusion, one has to say that there is nothing
meaningful to see in terms of the system functioning
in the area it was originally supposed to.142
Towards the end of his review of the various contexts in
which habeas corpus relief has been sought in Japan—mostly
unsuccessfully—he notes that from the outset it was anticipated that
habeas corpus might be used for achieving the handover of children.
However, it turned out that the number of petitioners
was vastly greater than anticipated. On this point, it
could be seen as an appositional phenomenon when
compared to the unexpectedly low number of
instances involving criminal procedures and other
detentions by authorities. Viewed from the original
aims of the system, this is clearly an exceptional
140

Those who have spent long enough watching Japanese news may have noticed that
it seems very rare for anyone to be arrested for murder. The more common charge is to be
arrested for unlawfully disposing of a dead body, the existence of a dead body presumably
providing adequate probable cause. Once in custody, the suspect is then encouraged to
confess and then formally arrested for murder, already in police custody.
141 Despite the Constitution permitting arrests only pursuant to an arrest or if the crime
is committed in the presence of the arresting officer or other person, article 210 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure allows police to make an “emergency arrest” (kinkyū taiho) of a
suspect who has likely committed a serious offense, without either a warrant or the crime
being committed in the presence of the arresting officer. C. Crim. Pro., supra note 37, art.
210.
142 Ōtani Masayoshi, Jinshinhogohō no 40 Nen [40 Years of the Habeas Corpus Act],
60:5 HŌRITSU RONSŌ 207, 228 (1988).
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situation. Notwithstanding the criticism of some
observers of the extent of such use, it appears to have
some special feature that is necessary to satisfy a
social need.143
He closes by noting a highly problematic jurisprudence in
what had come to be a widely used remedy within the sphere of
family law.
The use of habeas corpus in family cases had already been
evident a decade earlier, when Professor Takashi Ohmiya devoted a
sixty-page article in a suitably obscure law review to the subject of
the use of habeas corpus to achieve the handover (hikiwatashi) of
infant children.144 He had ample material to work with; his article
analyzes over fifty cases from all levels of the judiciary, and he starts
his analysis noting that in such cases “the best interests and welfare
of the child must be the most important consideration.”145
Professor Ohmiya describes habeas corpus as functioning as
a “provisional disposition” for deciding where a child should live
until permanent custody arrangements are sorted out by the courts.146
Available for his analysis is an extensive body of jurisprudence
involving considerations such as violent takings and “maternal
deprivation” that developed around these cases. 147 The original
purpose of the law is barely mentioned, and one would struggle to
find a constitutional linkage between this jurisdiction and the
constitutional ideals mentioned in article 1 of the Habeas Corpus
Act.148

XI.

THE COURT STEPS IN AGAIN

Although Professor Ohtani saw habeas corpus as addressing
a social need in family cases, a few years after he published his
143

Id. at 236.
Takashi Ohmiya, Kodomo no Hikiwatashi Seikyū to Jinshinhogohō (1) [Demands to
Hand Over Children and the Habeas Corpus Act (1)], 14 HOKKAIDŌ KOMAZAWA DAIGAKU
KENKYŪ KIYŌ 41 (1979).
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 This comment is not intended as a criticism of Professor Ohmiya. To the author’s
knowledge, the Japanese Supreme Court has never issued a decision clearly identifying a
constitutionally-significant dimension to the parent-child relationship.
144
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retrospective, the Supreme Court issued a decision indicating that
perhaps the remedy was being sought and granted too frequently. On
October 19, 1993 the Third Petty Bench pushed habeas corpus into
the background even in the limited universe of family law. This
decision is referred to as the “1993 Decision.”149
The case involved an appeal from a lower court opinion
ordering the return of two children to their mother from their father,
her estranged husband, and his parents. Determining that the home
environment and standard of living offered by both parents were not
markedly different, the lower court had relied on what was at the time
a standard judicial practice of preferring mothers to fathers in cases
involving young infants and ordered the return.150
The Third Petty Bench upheld the father’s appeal, quashing
the lower court decision and remanding for further proceedings.151
The court addressed what even today remains a basic legal
conundrum arising in cases involving the children of estranged yet
still legally married parents; under article 818 of the Japanese Civil
Code, parental authority (including what would now be called
“physical custody” or “care and control”) is exercised jointly by both
parents during marriage. 152 While courts can make a provisional
determination of physical custody prior to divorce, 153 parental
authority may only be vested in one parent (and only one parent, joint
parental authority out of marriage not being provided for) upon
divorce.154 Accordingly, before a court makes any dispositions on
where and by whom the children should be raised, both parents are
arguably within their rights making those decisions, even if they
conflict. This being the case, it was particularly miraculous that
courts over the preceding decades had been successful in finding
instances of conspicuous unlawfulness in “detentions” of these types
while persistently failing to do so in cases involving state actors. The
Court addressed this conundrum by declaring:
When the husband and the wife jointly exercise
parental authority over their infant child, the custody
149 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 19, 1993, Hei 5 (o) no. 609, SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANREI JŌHŌ] 1, 5099.
150 Id. at 5102.
151 Id. at 5099.
152 MINPŌ [CIV. C.] 1896, art. 818, no. 89 [hereinafter CIV. C.].
153 Id. art. 766.
154 Id. art. 819.
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of the child by either the husband or the wife should
be deemed to be legal under parental authority unless
there are special circumstances. Therefore, in order to
prove that the custody or restraint by either the
husband or the wife is conspicuously illegal as
referred to in Article 4 of the Habeas Corpus Rules,
such custody must be evidently more detrimental to
the child’s welfare.155
In short, the Court decided that the “conspicuously illegal”
threshold it created for itself in the Rules and had used to avoid using
habeas corpus for its original purpose should henceforth be used to
filter most of the “exceptional” child abduction cases out as well. To
be fair, the Court was also pointing out another basic flaw (from the
Court’s perspective) of using habeas corpus relief in child custody
disputes: Japan has an entire system of courts devoted to dealing with
such cases, one that has specialized resources and personnel lacking
at the District Courts which receive habeas corpus petitions. As
declared by the Court:
A dispute over custody of an infant child between the
child’s parents or the husband and the wife who have
joint parental authority but live separately, as in this
case, is basically subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of family courts, and the system for adjudication of
domestic relations as well as the human and material
resources of family courts exist particularly for the
purpose of investigating and adjudicating such dispute.
In cases where there is no danger to the infant child
nor is there any urgent problem concerning the
custody or rearing of the child, as in the present case,
it is impossible to find any reason to request relief
under the Habeas Corpus Act.156

155 See Judgment Concerning the Conspicuous Illegality of the Restraint Required in
Cases where Either the Husband or the Wife Requests the Other Party to Deliver Their Infant
Child under the Habeas Corpus Act, SUP. CT. JAPAN (1993), http://www.courts.go.jp/
app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1429 [https://perma.cc/3SEA-83WW] (presenting an English
translation of the judgment).
156 Id.
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Thereafter, habeas corpus relief became more unusual even in
these cases. This is illustrated by a study conducted by the Ninth
Civil Division of the Tokyo District Court and published in a 2007
issue of Hanrei Jihō, one of Japan’s most prestigious law journals.157
This study is referred to in this Court as the “Tokyo District Court
Study” and its review of habeas corpus petitions filed in the Tokyo
District Court from 2004 through 2006 revealed forty-three petitions,
approximately 70% of which were over the handover of a child.158
This represented an increase over a prior study of the court for cases
in the year 1990 and 1991, in which sixty cases were of this type.159
Of all of the petitions reviewed in the 2007 study, only one
was granted. Five were resolved through settlements between the
parties (wakai), and fourteen saw the petitions withdrawn.160
Recall that the withdrawal of petitions was a procedural
option not provided for in the law nor added in the Rules. A lawyer
in the 1948 Operating Committee had presciently objected to
allowing withdrawal of petitions because it could encourage coercion
to do so by the detaining party. 161 Yet the District Court Study
indicates the court unofficially “recommending” petitions be
withdrawn in cases involving children has become an accepted
practice.162
157

Tōkyō Chisai ni okeru Saikin no Jinshin Hogo Seikyū Jiken no Shori Jōkyō [The
Disposition of Recent Habeas Corpus Petitions in the Tokyo District Court], 1961 HANREI
JIHŌ [HANJI] 3 (2007) [hereinafter Tokyo District Court Study].
158 Id. The other types of claim included: (1) several petitions from a detainee claiming
his imprisonment was based on forged documents (all rejected on procedural grounds); (2)
a petition from chess champion Bobby Fischer who was detained in Narita at the instigation
of U.S. authorities for the (in retrospect bizarre) offense of having played a chess match in
Yugoslavia in 1992 (withdrawn after he was granted asylum and citizenship in Iceland); (3)
several petition from prison inmate seeking a transfer to a hospital prison due to a health
conditions (rejected on substantive grounds); (4) several petitions from prison inmates
making various complaints about the warden, including one complaining specifically about
the food (all rejected on procedural or substantive grounds); (5) two petitions filed by
prisoners immediately after their convictions were confirmed by the Supreme Court, both
asserting their innocence (one rejected on procedural grounds, the other on substantive); and
(6) one petition filed by brothers fighting over “possession” of an elderly mother
(withdrawn).
159 Tōkyō Chisai ni okeru Saikin no Jinshin Hogo Seikyū Jiken no Shori Jōkyō [The
Disposition of Recent Habeas Corpus Petitions in the Tokyo District Court], 1431 HANREI
JIHŌ [HANJI] 14 (1992).
160 Tokyo District Court Study, supra note 157, at 30.
161 OPERATING COMMITTEE MINUTES, supra note 64, at 63.
162 Tokyo District Court Study, supra note 157, at 10. On the subject of withdrawing
petitions, an interesting example of the process of entropy that beset habeas corpus can be
seen in a 1956 case involving a successful petition resulting in a patient being ordered
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The Tokyo District Court Study also shows courts to have
recast the “absence of other remedies” requirement added by article
4 of the Rules into a requirement of hojūsei, a term that could be
translated “supplementariness,” further relegating habeas corpus to
the realm of an obscure remedy that is rarely, if ever, available and
acting as a concept that serves as additional grounds for rejecting a
petition. As noted in the study:
At the very least, in cases between parents both vested
with parental authority, the general rule made clear
from precedent is that family court proceedings
starting with preservative dispositions under the
Domestic Relations Act. If a habeas corpus petition is
filed without going through these procedures, there is
a high probability that it will be dismissed for lacking
supplementariness or that it will not satisfy the
requirement that the conspicuous illegality be readily
apparent . . . [i]f a petitioner has not first gone through
family court proceedings, our court lets them know
and as a result, the majority of cases are withdrawn
before any substantive examination takes place.163
Of course, the rationale of the courts in resolving these cases
is hard to refute. Why parents (and their counsel) seek habeas corpus
relief in cases involving children despite the availability of court
proceedings should probably be explained. First, family court
procedures take time; there is a requirement that all disputes of this
type first go through court-sponsored conciliation, which may span
for months and during which the left-behind-parent may have little or
no contact with his or her child; many parents are understandably
impatient in such situations; and those who are forewarned of the
inefficacy of family courts (particularly fathers who may—rightly or
wrongly—perceive a bias against them in favor of mothers) may be
inclined to seek relief under a statute that at least purports to offer
released from a mental hospital by the trial court. The Supreme Court overturned this
decision and remanded it to the trial court for further proceedings. The trial court rejected
efforts by the (now free) petitioner to withdraw his petition and ordered him back into the
custody of the mental hospital. See Yamamoto Kōzō, Hanrei Jinshinhogohō [The Cases on
the Habeas Corpus Act], 62 DOSHISHA HōGAKU, Oct. 1960, at 57, 60 (defining petition
withdrawals).
163 Tokyo District Court Study, supra note 157, at 12 (emphasis added).
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“fast” and “easy” relief.164 Second, although family courts can order
the handover of a child as a provisional remedy, there are few
sanctions for not complying with family court orders or even
agreements made by the other party.165 Only the Habeas Corpus Act
offers the threat of criminal sanctions for non-compliance, or for
failing to “produce the body” by bringing the detained party to
court. 166 Though, even with respect to habeas corpus, the Study
indicates that there are no (other) mechanisms for enforcing a
judgment granting a petition.167 Moreover, for the criminal sanctions
to matter, police or prosecutors must care enough to enforce them;
the author is aware of only one case in which even the possibility of
criminal charges was triggered for non-compliance in a habeas corpus
case, though it does not appear to have been reported anywhere.
In any case, the Tokyo District Court Study reveals a
procedural regime that functions in a way that ensures a hearing
almost never happens in any case. Only two of the cases surveyed
(2.6% of the total) resulted in writs of habeas corpus being granted
and thus hearings. 168 Thus, in actual trials in which the detaining
party “produces the body” of the detained party to the court and is
required to explain the reasons for the detention in front of the
prisoner, the original purpose of habeas corpus has been effectively
excised from the act. In fact, the Tokyo District Court Study betrays
what comes across as grumbling about hearings when they do occur:
the requirement that a judgment be issued the same day as the hearing
is inflexible, the court must make a yes-or-no decision about who the
custodian of the children is, and the parties submit pleadings full of
subjective, conflicting evidence.169 In short, all the things that were
intended to be features in habeas corpus as originally conceived are
perceived as bugs in the remedy as it has been shaped by the court.
Not only that, but the lawyers who represent the detained (the
children) are described as poorly suited to the task of representing

164

Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 1.
Jones, supra note 137, at 245–257. Note, however, that the procedural regime for
enforcing handovers has changed since the time this article was written, though the basic
problem with enforceability has not.
166 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 18.
167 Tokyo District Court Study, supra note 157, at 10.
168 Id. at 4.
169 Id. at 10.
165
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them compared to the lawyers and expert investigators of family
courts.170

XII.

THE SHADOW OF HABEAS CORPUS TODAY

As is hopefully clear, habeas corpus in Japan has become
almost completely meaningless—at best it is a tuning fork used to
make other proceedings work a bit more harmoniously. Not only has
it become meaningless when compared to its original purpose, but it
is largely meaningless even within the context of the limited purpose
it has been allowed to serve in recent years.
Let us revisit article 1 of the Habeas Corpus Act, which I have
tried to render into a more grammatical, less quirky English
translation than the one promulgated in 1948:
The purpose of this law is for the Japanese people to
have their personal freedom quickly and easily
restored through the courts when actually and
wrongfully deprived of it, in accordance with the
Constitution of Japan and its guarantee of fundamental
human rights.171
As already described in length, court practice and article 4 of
the Rules have ensured that habeas corpus is neither quick nor easy,
or even available most of the time. More fundamentally, however, to
the author’s knowledge no one has ever indicated the “fundamental
human rights”172 implicated in the child custody cases that became
the mainstay of habeas corpus jurisprudence. While the Supreme
Court in its 1993 Decision rightly pointed out the difficulty of finding
conspicuous illegality in cases involving disputes among parents both
having parental authority, it failed to identify what constitutional
rights would be violated even in situations when this threshold was
met.173 Remember, habeas corpus was intended to give life to article
170

Id.
Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 1 (author translation).
172 Id.
173 Interestingly, habeas corpus could have but never actually did play a meaningful role
in countering the criticism levelled against the role of Japanese judiciary in Japan becoming
viewed internationally as a haven for international parental child abduction prior to its
ratification of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
in 2014. Although prior to this there were countless instances of foreign parents seeking the
171
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34 and possibly a few other provisions of the constitution, none of
which are implicated in child custody cases.
To the author’s knowledge, no court or commentator has dealt
with the very basic question: does a child—an infant in many of these
cases—even have “personal freedom,” and, even if they do, is it being
“deprived” by living with dad, going to kindergarten, and seeing
grandma?174 This is not to trivialize the problems involved in these
cases or the potentially negative impact they may have on children,
an impact well worth judicial attention. The fact remains, however,
that there is a basic failure to identify any constitutional dimension to
these cases, just as Japan’s Supreme Court has failed to identify any
constitutionally-protected dimension in the parent-child relationship
generally.175
It might be possible to argue that Article 1 of the Habeas
Corpus Act is merely hortatory and that even if the remedy the act
establishes has ended up being an obscure and supplementary one, it
is at least a remedy. This is perhaps true, but it is worth pointing out
that even in this context, it is largely meaningless for another key
reason, a reason related directly to how the Supreme Court has chosen
to shape it over the years: in the rare instance when a habeas corpus
return of children abducted to Japan from foreign countries (including numerous instances
where this was done in violation of foreign law and/or court orders) by a Japanese parent,
both through habeas corpus and other remedies available in the family court system, virtually
no children were ever returned. See generally, Jones, supra note 137. Interestingly, habeas
corpus petitioners failed in these cases despite a 2003 Supreme Court decision upholding the
arrest and conviction under an obscure anti-human trafficking provision of the Penal Code
of a foreign father trying to leave Japan, in part due to the greater degree of illegality of
removing children across borders. See Colin P.A. Jones, No More Excuses: Why Recent
Penal Code Amendments Should (But Probably Won’t) Stop International Parental Child
Abduction to Japan, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 351 (2007) (discussing the effect
of amendments of the penal code on parental child abduction in Japan).
174 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14, art. 1. The closest the court came to dealing with
this issue involved a rather fanciful application of logic. In a July 4, 1968 decision of the
First Petty Bench declared that it was clearly established by prior precedent (including the
1958 Decision) that “exercising custody over an infant lacking capacity to form intent
naturally involves restricting the personal freedom of the infant, but that does not prevent
such restrictions from being deemed “detention” under the Habeas Corpus Act or the rules
thereunder.” In other words, because the exercise of custody naturally involves the
restriction of the freedom of children, such custody can be exercised in a “conspicuously
unlawful” manner for habeas corpus purposes.
175 It is also worth noting that in cases involving children courts have somehow managed
to avoid getting tied up in the restrictions it sought to impose on “real” detainees, the ones
intended to minimize instances when petitioners were filed by someone other than the
detainee, as described infra, and possibly over the objections of the detainee.
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petition actually does result in a hearing, the hearing itself will almost
certainly be a meaningless formality.
This is because with “conspicuous” illegality established by
the Rules and precedent as the threshold a petitioner must satisfy for
a petition to be accepted by a court, acceptance by the court means it
will have already made up its mind as to how to decide based on the
pleadings.
In child custody cases, this should be entirely unsurprising
since, as indicated by the Tokyo District Court’s description of its
own practice, petitioners would first be required to exhaust their
options at family court.176 A habeas corpus petition being accepted
would mean that the petitioner already has a custody decree or other
orders from a family court (in proceedings that were unlikely to have
been either quick or easy). Lacking the specialized expertise and
resources of a family court, which (hopefully) will have already
devoted significant time and resources to understanding the situation
of the children at issue and what should be done for them, how could
a District Court do anything other than ratifying a decision already
made elsewhere?
As noted by the Tokyo District Court Study, cases involving
children mostly involve violations of family court decrees (i.e., by the
“detaining” parent).177 A decade’s worth of informal discussions by
this author with lawyers and former judges involved in child custody
matters confirm the view that habeas corpus hearings are not a place
where judges make decisions based on oral arguments; they are often
a meaningless formality leading to a preordained conclusion.178
176

Tokyo District Court Study, supra note 157, at 10.
Tokyo District Court Study, supra note 157, at 6.
178 The author would venture that another key feature of habeas corpus has also been
rendered largely meaningless—the requirement that the detained party have counsel
appointed, at state expense, if necessary. While many parents might welcome the
appointment of independent counsel for a child abducted by the other parent, it seems
unlikely that a lawyer appointed to represent the child would be in a position to advocate for
anything different from what the family court has already decided is in his or her best
interests.
The role of habeas corpus even in child custody cases may be shunted further into
the background in connection with the implementation by Japan of the Hague Convention
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, which went into effect in Japan on
April 1, 2014. Japan’s implementing legislation and related rules provide for an entire
procedural regime by which Japan’s courts would review petitions for return of children
under the treaty, though it was unsure how (and if enforcement would work). See, e.g., Colin
P.A. Jones, Towards an “Asian” Child Abduction Treaty? Some Observations on Singapore
and Japan Joining the Hague Convention (Asian Law Institute Working Paper Series No.
177
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The meaninglessness of habeas corpus hearings when they do
happen is suggested by an interesting tort case brought against the
presiding judge of the Himeji Branch of the Kobe District Court over
a 2001 habeas corpus case that involved no less than four hearings.179
The father “detaining” the two children failed to bring them to the
first hearing (because they were in Texas for medical reasons, he
explained later), but he did bring them to the next hearing.180 Before
the hearing, he reluctantly surrendered the children to court personnel,
and they did not participate in the proceedings. 181 The court then
heard from the petitioning mother, counsel for the detained children,
and the father before issuing a “provisional” disposition ordering the
children handed over to the mother. 182 This transfer was
accomplished by the simple expedient of ensuring she left the
courtroom first and then physically preventing the father from leaving
until she was gone with the children. 183 Unsurprisingly, the two
subsequent hearings upheld the “provisional” ruling and the tort
claim against the presiding judge (and the state) was unsuccessful.
There may be little to commend the father in his actions in this case,
but it is a case that illustrates the generally meaningless nature of
habeas corpus proceedings.184
Thus, what Anglo-American lawyers would likely regard as
the most important and meaningful aspect of habeas corpus
031, 2013) (discussing effect of the Hague Convention on Japan). Three years since taking
effect, cases in which return orders by Japanese courts have proven unenforceable have
started to receive attention, but in no instance that the author is aware of has habeas corpus
been suggested on the Japanese side as a final remedy (and the only one with possible penal
sanctions for non-compliance). See Simon Scott, Three Years After Japan Signed Hague,
Parents Who Abduct Still Win, JAPAN TIMEs (May 1, 2017): http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
community/2017/05/01/issues/three-years-japan-signed-hague-parents-abduct-stillwin/#.WQ_JtTdUvIU [https://perma.cc/NG9L-XS8P].
179 Kōbe Chihō Saibansho [Kōbe Dist. Ct.] Apr. 15, 2002, Hei 13 (gyō u) no. 20, SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANREI JŌHŌ] 1, http://www.courts.go.jp/app/
hanrei_jp/detail4?id=7221 [https://perma.cc/3ZPK-PT42].
180 Id.
181 Note that the parties intended to play a leading role in habeas corpus as it was
originally designed—the detained persons—do not even appear in the courtroom in this type
of case! Note that they should, in the case of infants, but this serves as further illustration of
how far habeas corpus has come from its textual origins and legislative intent.
182 Kōbe Chihō Saibansho [Kōbe Dist. Ct.] Apr. 15, 2002, Hei 13 (gyō u) no. 20, SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI JŌHŌ [SAIBANREI JŌHŌ] 1, http://www.courts.go.jp/app/
hanrei_jp/detail4?id=7221 [https://perma.cc/3ZPK-PT42].
183 Id.
184 Recent informal discussions between the author and lawyers handling habeas corpus
cases seem to confirm that the results of hearings are preordained.
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proceedings, the hearing at which a detaining party and his prisoner
confront each other and argue over the constitutional or other legal
principles involved, has been effectively excised from habeas corpus
in Japan through Supreme Court rules and judicial practice. This has
resulted in the Habeas Corpus Act becoming not a tool of the
Japanese people for enforcing the constitution, as was unequivocally
the original intent, but a tool by which courts at least double-check,
but almost always ratify decisions regarding child custody or
detention made elsewhere. Japan’s judiciary prevented habeas
corpus from being abused by destroying it.
Perhaps there is some value to even the small role habeas
corpus has retained. But the fact that many of the practices used by
police and prosecutors to coerce suspects into confessing that were
cited at the time of the Habeas Corpus Act’s adoption—prolonged,
coercive detentions, limited bail, and so forth—remain an integral
and frequently-criticized feature of the Japanese criminal justice
system today would not seem to say very much about the state of the
constitutional protections in this sphere.

XIII.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In fairness, habeas corpus—and perhaps constitutions—may
be overrated and idealized by Anglo-American jurists. As has been
pointed out by Professor Paul Halliday, the history of the
development of habeas corpus in the West may have been as much
about the establishment of the superiority of Royal Courts compared
to other courts and authorities, first in England then later throughout
the British Empire.185 In this light, habeas corpus was as much a tool
for helping to establish a judicial hierarchy. It has arguably played
the same role in the United States, where it was first canonized
through its protection in the U.S. Constitution and subsequently
enabled federal courts to establish their superiority over state courts
by providing a means for the former to review the constitutionality of
proceedings leading to the latter resulting in deprivations of freedom.
As suggested by Professor Halliday in his concluding remarks,
the key to the success of habeas corpus—where it actually was
successful—was “a powerful court.” 186 Even within the British
185 See generally, PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010)
(providing a historical and empirical analysis of the writ of habeas corpus).
186 Id. at 301.
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Empire, however, where powerful courts were lacking, “habeas
corpus operated as only a shadow of its theoretical self.”187
It is widely acknowledged that, with some exceptions, Japan
lacks powerful courts and Japanese people have low expectations of
the judiciary. 188 Those courts it does have are part of a national
bureaucracy with a hierarchy that is both defined by law and subject
to a much more detailed, unwritten stratigraphy that is unofficial but
well-known by insiders. 189 Moreover, despite constitutional
separation of powers, on a working level the judiciary maintains
relations with executive branch agencies, particularly the Ministry of
Justice (which is run by prosecutors).190 A remedy like habeas corpus,
which could set individual courts at odds with each other outside of
the framework of the established hierarchy or upset institutionalized
working-level relationships with other government institutions, is a
remedy the judiciary probably doesn’t need—even if the people of
Japan might.
As noted at the outset, the author believes that what happened
to habeas corpus in Japan is likely symptomatic of what has happened
to other ideals reflected in the constitution. This includes the ideals
that the Habeas Corpus Act was supposed to realize. What happened
to habeas corpus may be an extreme example, but at the same time
one that is particularly easy to distinguish and track, given the discrete,
specific nature of the remedy, the constitutional principal to which it
relates, and its readily verifiable fate down a dirt road of judicial
desuetude.

187

Id.
See, e.g., SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS 150 (2011) (“Since most of the public had not expected the courts to play much
active role in solving legal disputes in general, it is natural that they had not expected the
courts to enforce the Constitution more vigorously.”); CARL GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW
IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 262 (2003) (noting the weak enforcement powers and
other limitations of Japanese courts).
189 See, e.g., SEGI HIROSHI, NIPPON NO SAIBAN [JAPANESE TRIALS] (2015).
190 This can be confirmed by reviewing any edition of the Seikan Yōran, a quarterly
directory of national government institutions and the politicians and bureaucrats who serve
in them, published by Seikan Yōransha (http://www.seisakujihou.co.jp). This directory
shows that any given time most of the bureau chiefs and other leadership positions in the
Ministry of Justice are filled by prosecutors. It also shows that some positions in the MOJ
and other executive branch institutions (such as the Cabinet Legislation Bureau) are filled
by people who have previously been working in the judiciary.
188
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APPENDIX 1: HABEAS CORPUS ACT191

Article 1. In accordance with the principle [sic] of the
Japanese Constitution which guarantees the fundamental human
rights, this Law aims at the rapid and easy recovery by the judicial
court of the freedom of the person which is illegally restrained.
Article 2. A person whose freedom of action is restrained
without the proper legal procedure may apply for its recover in
accordance with the provisions of this law.
Any person may present the preceding application on behalf
of the person who is held under such restraint.
Article 3. The application mentioned in the preceding Article
shall be made by attorney on behalf of the restrained person.
However, in cases where there exist extraordinary circumstances, it
can be made by the applicant himself.
Article 4. The application provided for in Article 2 may be
presented in writing orally to the High Court or District Court which
has the [sic] jurisdiction over the district where the restrained, the
restrainer or the application [sic: applicant] resides.
Article 5. Such application in writing shall contain the
following items specifically, and it shall be offered with necessary
materials for presumptive proof:
1. Name of the restrained;
2. Purpose of the request;
3. Fact of the detention;
4. Restrainer known:
5. Place of detention known.
Article 6. The Law Court must make decision without delay
on the request under Article 2.
Article 7. The Court may, in cases where the application
lacks requisite vindications or necessary presumptive proof dismiss it
by a decision.
Article 8. Upon receipt of the application provided for in
Article 2, the Court may, by request of the applicant or through its
authority transfer the case to another Court considered to have
competent jurisdiction.
191 Habeas Corpus Act, supra note 14. This English version is presented as it appears in
the English version of the Official Gazette, including errors in grammar and spelling together
with quirky expressions.
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Article 9. The Court may, except [sic; in] the cases
prescribed in the preceding two Articles, immediately make the
necessary inquiry, in order to prepare for investigations at the time of
trial, into the reason for the restraint and other matters by conducting
a hearing on the statement made by the restrained, the applicant and
their attorneys and other interested parties.
The Court may cause the members of the collegiate court to
make the preliminary inquiry mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
Article 10. In case of necessity, the Court may release in
order to release the restrained person temporarily by its decision,
either under each that the restrained shall present himself at any time
when summoned or on the conditions deemed proper, or may
otherwise take appropriate steps prior to conducting the trial provided
for in Article 16.
In the case where the restrained person under the preceding
Article shall not present himself, he may be arrested.
Article 11. The Court may dismiss the application (for such
releases) without any proceeding for trial, when it has become evident
through the preliminary inquiry that there exists no ground justifying
the said application.
When the court makes the decision under the preceding
paragraph, it shall rescind the disposal carried out before under
Article 10 and, causing the restrained person to present himself, hand
him to the restrainer.
Article 12. Except in case of Article 7 or Paragraph1 of the
preceding Article, the Court shall designate a certain date and place
and summon for trial the applicant or his attorney, the restrained
person and the restrainer.
While issuing a habeas corpus warrant to the restrainer to
cause the person so restrained to appear at the designated date and
place provided for in the preceding paragraph, the Court shall direct
him to submit a written answer concerning the date, place of and the
reason for such restraint, by the day of the trial mentioned in the
preceding paragraph.
In the warrant mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the fact
that if the restrainer does not obey the said warrant, he may be placed
under arrest or taken into custody until he obeys the order and shall
be liable to a fine not exceeding \500 for each day’s delay shall be
explicitly stated.
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There shall be a period of three days between the forwarding
of the said warrant and the day of trial. However, the trial shall be
held within one week from the date under which the request under
Article 2 was made. This period may be shortened or prolonged, as
the case may be.
Article 13. The order mentioned in the preceding Article shall
be notified to the Court which has issued the warrant concerning the
restraint and to the Procurator.
The Judges of the Court and the Procurator mentioned in the
preceding paragraph may present themselves on the day of trial.
Article 14. The investigations on the day of the trial shall be
conducted at an open court attended by the restrained person, the
restrainer, the applicant and his attorney.
When there is no such attorney, the Court shall select one
from among the qualified lawyers.
The attorneys under the preceding paragraph may request for
travelling expenses, daily allowances, hotel expenses and
compensation.
Article 15. On the day of the trial, the Court, upon hearing the
statement of the applicant and the reply of the restrainer, shall conduct
investigations on materials for presumptive proof.
The restrainer shall clarify the reasons for detentions.
Article 16. If the Court, upon investigations [sic], finds such
application groundless, it shall dismiss it by decision and hand over
to the restrainer the person so detained.
In the case of the preceding paragraph, the provisions of
Article 11, Paragraph 2 shall apply.
In cases where the application is based on sufficient ground,
the court shall forthwith release the person under restraint.
Article 17. In the trial provided for in Article 7, Article 11,
Paragraph 1, and in the preceding Article, the Court may saddle [sic]
the restrainer or the applicant with the entire costs spent in the
procedure, or a part thereof.
Article 18. In cases where the restrainer refuses to obey the
order mentioned in Article 12, Paragraph 2, the Court may arrest him
or keep him in custody until he obeys the order, and impose on him a
fine not exceeding \500 per each day’s delay.
Article 19. The restrainer, if notified by the person under
restraint that the requests the benefit of an attorney on his behalf, shall
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immediately notify the request to the attorney whom he may
nominate.
Article 20. The Court which has received the application
provided for in Article 2, or the Court to which such application has
been forwarded shall immediately notify the Supreme Court of the
case and report to it on the progress and results of the steps taken in
connection therewith.
Article 21. In regard to the decision made by the lower Court,
an appeal may be made to the Supreme Court within 3 days.
Article 22. The Supreme Court, if it finds such steps
necessary, may cause the Lower Court to transfer the pending case,
irrespective of the stage of its proceedings and may directly review it.
The Supreme Court, under the circumstances mentioned in
the preceding paragraph, may nullify or alter the decision or verdict
pronounced by the lower court.
Article 23. The Supreme Court may decide on necessary rules
governing such application, examination, trial and other matters.
Article 24. Judgments which were passed according to other
laws and are unfavourable to the restrained shall be invalied [sic] to
the extent they conflict with the judgment under this Law.
Article 25. Those who have been relieved by this Law shall
not be restrained on the same ground without the judgment of the
Court.
Article 26. Anyone who undertakes to remove or hide the
restrained or contrives his escape, or who commits an act which may
nullify the relief prescribed by this Law, or who deliberately makes
incorrect entries in the written answer mentioned in Article 12,
Paragraph 2, shall be liable to penal servitude of less than 2 years or
a fine not exceeding ¥ 50,000.
Supplementary Provisions
This Law shall come into force after the lapse of 60 days from
the date of its promulgation.
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APPENDIX 2: HABEAS CORPUS RULES (EXTRACTS)192

(Purport of this Rule)
Article 1. The application for relief and the succeeding
proceedings thereto made under the Habeas Corpus Act . . . shall be
governed by this Rule, as well as the provisions of the Law.
(Content of the relief)
Article 2. The relief under the Law shall be realized by a
ruling rendered in accordance with provisions of paragraph 2 of
Article 12 of the Law by the court . . . commanding the person
restraining another person to produce the body of the prisoner at a
certain time and place and submit a written reply by the day of the
trial, in order to do, submit to and receive the release or other
dispositions which the court considers suitable in [sic] behalf of the
prisoner . . . .
(Definition of the restraint and the person restraining another)
(Requisites of the application)
Article 4. The application mentioned in Article 2 of the Law
may be made only if it is obvious and conspicuous that the restrain{t}
or a judgment order or other disposition relating to the restraint has
been made without jurisdiction or authority or has been remarkably
conflicted with formalities or proceedings prescribed in laws, orders
or rules. But, in cases where there exists any other adequate means
whereby relief may be obtained, the abovementioned application may
not be made unless it is evident that relief cannot be obtained within
reasonable time [sic].
Article 5. The application mentioned in Article 2 of the Law
cannot be made against the freely expressed intention of the prisoner.
(Dismissal of application by a ruling)
Article 21. The court may, by a ruling, dismiss an application
in the following cases:
1. Where an application is illegal and its defects are such that
it cannot be repaired;

192

Jinshinhogo Kisoku [Habeas Corpus Rules], Sup. Ct. Rule No. 22 of 1948 (emphasis

added).
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2. Where an applicant [sic] is made against the freely
expressed intention of the prisoner;
3. Where a person restraining another or his residence is
uncertain;
4. Where the prisoner has died;
5. Where the prisoner had recovered freedom of his action;
6. Where it is evident that there exists no ground justifying
the application.
It is not necessary that a ruling under the preceding is notified
to a person restraining another, except that he has been examined in
the preliminary inquiry.
(Nature of proceedings of the application)
Article 46. The proceedings of the application for relief under
the Law shall be governed, unless contrary to its nature, by the
provisions governing civil procedure, as well as those of the Law and
this Rule.
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